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South Africa faces significant environmental challenges in relation to 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions mainly caused by the use of fossil fuels to provide 
energy coupled with the relatively inefficient nature of the South African energy 
sector. In addition the country now faces electricity supply constraints as evidenced 
by the electricity crisis in 2008. Industrial energy consumption forms a large 
component of the energy sector in South Africa. Therefore, there is significant scope 
for improved energy efficiency in industry to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and 
electricity supply constraints. Market-based instruments (MBIs) are being 
increasingly used to drive environmental improvement globally and in South Africa 
and provide a potentially powerful tool to promote domestic industrial energy 
efficiency. This dissertation evaluates the current array of MBIs that use existing 
markets to promote industrial energy efficiency in South Africa. The MBIs identified 
in this regard are the additional investment and energy efficiency allowances 
available under s12I and s12L of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962,  the electricity levy 
implemented under the Customs and Excise Act 91 of 1964, Eskom’s Demand Side 
Management (DSM) programme and NERSA’s proposed Cogeneration Feed-in 
Tariff (COFIT) programme. The latter three MBIS are incorporated into the recent 
attempt to make electricity prices more ‘cost reflective’ along with Renewable 
Energy Feed-in Tariff (REFIT) costs and the cost of capital to fund the new build 
programme. The main shortcoming of this range of MBIs is the failure to cover 
energy products such as coal and fuel oil as the main focus has been on electricity 
pricing to date. Energy–carbon taxes have been used successfully in Europe to drive 
industrial energy efficiency and reduce GHG. Drawing on the experience of the 
European Council directive 2003/96/EC of 27 October 2003 Restructuring the 
Community Framework for the Taxation of Energy Products and Electricity and the 
carbon tax options described in the National Treasury Discussion Paper Reducing 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions: The Carbon Tax Option (2010) there may be an 
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South Africa faces significant environmental challenges, especially in 
relation to greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions associated with the widespread use of 
fossil fuels. In world terms, South Africa is ranked as the 11th highest GHG emitting 
country 1  and even higher in terms of emission intensity. 2  Significant emission 
reduction efforts would be required by the country to meet the theoretical targets 
estimated to represent South Africa’s contribution to global stabilisation of GHG 
levels.3 South Africa has recently committed to mitigation action to reduce GHG 
emissions to 42 per cent below the ‘business as usual’ growth trajectory by 2025.4 
South Africa’s energy sector accounts for 79 per cent of the country’s total 
GHG emissions.5 For the purposes of this dissertation, the energy sector is here 
defined as the production and supply of energy as well as the consumption of energy 
due to the intrinsic link between supply and demand and the cradle to grave 
1 Department of Environment Affairs and Tourism National Climate Change Response Policy 
Discussion Document for the 2009 National Climate Change Response Policy Development Summit, 
Midrand, 2-6 March 2009 at 12. 
2 Emissions measured as a function of GDP. South Africa ranks higher than developed OECD 
countries and developed countries such as India and Brazil. Scenario Building Team 2007 Long Term 
Mitigation Scenarios-Strategic Options for South Africa: Technical Summary (2007) Department of 
Environment Affairs and Tourism, Pretoria at 3. 
3 Long Term Mitigation Scenarios (2007) at 25.  
4 The commitment includes an interim target of 34% below ‘business as usual’ emissions by 2020 and 
is predicated on provision of financial resources, the transfer of technology and capacity building 
support be developed countries. Department of Environment Affairs (Alf Wills) letter to Executive 
Secretary of UNFCCC 29 January 2010. Available at http://unfccc.int/meetings/items/5276.php.  
(Accessed 10.09.2011). 
5 Inventory data from 1990, 1994 and 2000 show an increasing trend in the energy sector’s 
contribution to GHG emissions from 75.1 to 78.9%. Table 0-4. Department of Environment Affairs 
and Tourism Draft National Greenhouse Gas Inventory for the Republic of South Africa: Invitation 




(lifecycle)6 responsibility imposed on producers by modern environmental thinking. 
The high contribution to GHG emissions is mainly attributed to the dominant use of 
coal to supply the country’s energy needs.7 There are two primary aspects to this. 
Firstly, coal is emission intensive as an energy source in that the combustion of coal 
to provide energy or generate electricity and the conversion to liquid fuels in Sasol’s 
coal to liquid technology is very energy-intensive.8 Secondly, abundant resources of 
low-grade coal have resulted in the inefficient consumption of energy. Coal is 
relatively cheap by international standards so that historically South Africa has been 
able to maintain low electricity prices 9  and foster the development of energy-
intensive industry. 10  In addition, industrial policy has actively encouraged the 
development of energy-intensive industry through policies and incentives.11  
 
A side effect of low electricity prices is that energy efficiency was not 
sufficiently prioritised in the past and South Africa is fairly energy inefficient as a 
result. 12 The 1998 White Paper on the Energy Policy of the Republic of South Africa 
defines energy efficiency as ‘a measure of the savings of energy, which is used to 
provide goods and services, while maintaining the desired benefits.’13 It is generally 
                                                     
6 National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998.  
7About 75% of the total energy consumption in 2004 from coal. South African Government Draft 
Clean Technology Fund Investment Plan (October 2009) at 3. 
8 Only one third of energy from coal is usable as liquid fuel. Department of Minerals and Energy 
National Energy Efficiency Strategy of the Republic of South Africa, First Review October 2008 in 
GN 908 GG 32342 of 26 June 2009 at 16. 
9 Even after proposed electricity price increases, South Africa will be among the lowest cost producers 
of electricity. South African Government National Response to South Africa’s Electricity Shortage 
(Jan 2008) at 2. Available at http://www.info.gov.za/otherdocs/2008/resp_elec.pdf (Accessed 
06.09.2011) 
10 Energy Efficiency Strategy (2008) at 17. 
11 Winkler H, Jooste M & Marquard A ‘Structuring Approaches to Pricing Carbon in Energy-and 
Trade-Intensive Sectors in South Africa’ (2010) 10 Climate Policy 527 at 529. 
12 Department of Minerals and Energy White Paper on the Energy Policy of the Republic of South 
Africa GN 307 GG 19606 of 17 of December 1998. 




agreed that there is significant scope to reduce greenhouse gas emissions through 
more efficient energy consumption.14 
 
 Industry and mining account for almost half of the energy usage in the 
country15 due to energy-intensive processes such as deep shaft gold mining, coal to 
liquid fuel production and aluminium smelting.16 The Department of Minerals and 
Energy (DME) suggests that energy savings of 50 per cent of current usage is 
theoretically possible when compared to international best practice for the sector.17  
 
In recent years, the South Africa’s energy industry’s constraints in meeting 
electricity demand give additional impetus to the need for dramatic change in the 
sector. The electricity crisis in 2008 highlighted the problem that demand had caught 
up with generation capacity in the country and that the reserve margin was and 
remains insufficient for planned maintenance and unplanned outages.18 Since 2008, 
short-term conservation measures were implemented to ration energy consumption to 
manage the short fall19 while, more recently, plans are being developed to provide 
additional generation capacity.20 Energy demand has stabilised since then, but this is 
believed to be more a consequence of the economic downturn than a measure of 
                                                     
14 Long Term Mitigation Scenarios (2007); DEA Climate Change Policy Discussion Document 
(2009); Department of Water and Environment Affairs Draft National Strategy on Sustainable 
Development and Action Plan 2010-2014 in GN 393 GG 33184 of 14 May 2010; Energy Efficiency 
Strategy (2008). 
15 43.2 % made up of 36.2 % from industry and 7% from mining. Energy Efficiency Strategy (2008) at 
16. 
16 Energy Efficiency Strategy (2008) at 17. 
17 Energy Efficiency Strategy (2008) at 24. 
18 Energy Efficiency Strategy (2008) at 5.  
19 Eskom implemented a power conservation program (PCP) that includes demand side management 
measures such as load shedding, quota allocations, penalties and cut-offs, incentives and a ‘right to 
consume’ (RTC) trading scheme. Energy Efficiency Strategy (2008) at 11-12. 
20 Capacity expansion plans include a ‘new build’ programme and ‘return to service’ of several 





success for demand side management (DSM) measures. 21  Similar shortages are 
likely to recur once the economy begins to recover.22 The government clearly needs 
to implement a policy framework that drives energy efficient development on a more 
sustainable basis.23 
 
Therefore, it is not surprising that industrial energy efficiency is increasingly 
highlighted as a focus area by government24 and emerging policy in the arena of 
sustainable development, climate change and energy seeks to address many of the 
issues discussed above, including strategies that promote energy efficiency.25  
 
A range of regulatory instruments and strategies is available to government to 
drive the desired improvement in energy efficiency. Initial regulatory efforts to 
promote energy efficiency have focused primarily around either prescriptive 
interventions such as standard setting and labelling26 or voluntary programmes such 
as the Energy Accord.27 These measures remain largely ineffective in encouraging 
energy efficiency improvements while coal and electricity prices remain low.  
                                                     
21 Citing Trevor Manual, Minister in the Presidency responsible for the National Planning 
Commission - Creamer T ‘South Africa Has to Show Greater Power-Crisis Urgency’ 15 Jan 2010 
Engineering News. 
22 Ibid. 
23 It should be noted that conservation measures are short-term emergency measures that may have a 
negative impact on production, whereas interventions are envisaged in the medium to longer term to 
improve energy efficiency while having a positive impact on production. Energy Efficiency Strategy 
(2008) at 5. 
24  Buyelwa Sonjica, Minister of Minerals and Energy in the foreword to the Energy Efficiency 
Strategy (2008) at 4. 
25Draft Sustainable Development Strategy (2010); Department of Minerals and Energy White Paper 
on the Renewable Energy Policy of the Republic of South Africa (2003) in GN 513 GG 26169 of 14 
May 2004; Energy White Paper (1998); DEA Climate Change Policy Discussion Document (2009) 
26 Energy Efficiency Strategy (2008) at 5 and 10. 
27 A voluntary Energy Efficiency Accord was initiated by DME in 2005 and is administered by the 
National Business Initiative (NBI) Energy Efficiency Technical Committee. Department of Minerals 





Another important component of possible regulatory mechanisms is a group 
of measures known as market-based instruments (MBIs) which employ market-based 
forces to shape the behaviours of energy consumers. The range of MBIs is complex 
and diverse and different instruments may be more suitable to achieve specific 
objectives.  MBIs may be characterised as those using existing markets such as taxes 
and those creating new markets such as emissions trading schemes.28 Typically, new 
market mechanisms are complex and expensive to set up.29  This dissertation is 
delimited to MBIs that use existing markets as these appear to be favoured by current 
South African fiscal policy.30 Policy documents and legislation published in the last 
four years show an increasing trend towards the use of MBIs to achieve 
environmental and demand management objectives in the energy sector.31  
 
                                                                                                                                                      
http://www.nbi/org/za/SiteCollectionDocuments/energy_efficiency_accord.pdf  (Accessed 
11.09.2011). 
28 National Treasury Draft Policy Paper: A Framework for Considering Market–Based Instruments to 
Support Environmental Fiscal Reform in South Africa (2006) Government Printers, Pretoria at 43; 
Paterson A ‘Incentive-Based Measures’ in A Paterson A and Kotze LJ (eds) Environmental 
Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa: Legal Perspectives (2009) 232-321 at 300. 
29 Robb G, Tyler E and Cloete B Carbon Trading or Carbon Tax? Weighing Up South Africa’s 
Mitigation Options Unpublished paper presented at ‘Putting a Price on Carbon’ Conference held at the 
University of Cape Town, 23-24 March 2010, 196-213 at 208. 
30National Treasury Discussion Paper Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions: The Carbon Tax Option 
(2010) at 6. Available at 
http://www.treasury.gov.za/public%20comments/Discussion%20Paper%20Carbon%20Taxes%20812
10.pdf (Accessed 06.09.2011); National Treasury Budget 2010/2011 Tax proposals (2010)at 26. 
Available at 
http://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/national%20budget/2010/guides/Budget%20Tax%20Proposals
.pdf (Accessed 06.09.2011).  
31 These policy documents will be discussed in more detail in chapter 4. Examples are  
Draft MBI Policy (2006); Energy Efficiency Strategy (2008); DEA Climate Change Policy Discussion 





In light of the above, this dissertation focuses on the growing role that MBIs 
play in promoting energy efficiency in South African industry as a targeted approach 
to address greenhouse gas emissions and electricity supply constraints in the energy 
sector.  
 
The dissertation is divided into seven chapters. Following this introductory 
chapter, the second chapter explores in more detail the role of industrial energy 
consumption in South Africa’s energy realities and why there is a need to promote 
energy efficiency through the use of MBIs. Chapter 3 describes the theoretical 
understanding of MBI’s and discusses the key issues identified for their successful 
introduction. The fourth chapter reviews the relevant South African environmental, 
energy and fiscal policies to highlight governments’ recognition of the role that 
industrial energy efficiency and MBIs may play in the promotion of energy 
efficiency in local industry. The fifth chapter identifies and critically evaluates major 
MBIs (using existing markets) that have been implemented to date in South Africa to 
promote energy efficiency in industry. In chapter 6, the European Union (EU) 
experience with energy-carbon taxes and the fledging carbon tax developments in 
South Africa are assessed as a possible way forward to address potential gaps in the 
existing array of MBIs identified in chapter 5. The seventh chapter contains the 





2. A Background to South Africa’s Energy Sector 
 
As discussed in chapter 1, this dissertation focuses on improved energy 
efficiency in South African industry as a means to address some of South Africa’s 
current environmental and economic challenges. To better understand the importance 
of the role that industrial energy efficiency may play in this regard, one needs to 
know where industrial energy consumption fits within the context of the South 
African energy sector and the challenges that face the country within this sector. This 
chapter outlines the main features of the domestic energy sector, highlighting 
industrial energy consumption patterns. It includes a brief survey of the key 
challenges facing the local energy sector and the role that energy efficiency might 
play in addressing them. These include socio-economic, environmental and 
regulatory challenges.  
 
2.1. Nature of the Domestic Energy Sector 
 
The energy sector comprises both the production and consumption of energy 
products such as coal, liquid fuels and electricity. It is difficult to disaggregate the 
production and consumption aspects of these energy products as they are linked in 
various ways. Firstly, energy production output is necessarily determined by energy 
consumption patterns. Secondly, energy is consumed by the energy industry during 
the production of energy products and electricity. Thirdly, the impact of changes in 
energy consumption may occur upstream at the production level. For example, 
reduced electricity demand may ultimately result in reduced air emissions from coal-
fired power stations. Therefore, the domestic energy sector is discussed below in 
terms of the primary energy sources used and the main energy products that are 





 Although South Africa is described as a developing country, the energy 
production and supply system is well developed.32 The country relies heavily on 
fossil fuels with close to 90 per cent of the country’s primary energy source is 
provided by coal and crude oil, roughly 70 per cent from coal and 20 per cent from 
crude oil.33 The remaining 10 per cent is made up of nuclear, gas34 and renewable 
energy sources. Renewable energy in South Africa consists largely of biomass 
material that can be replenished.35 Technologies using wind power or solar energy 
are not yet being widely implemented although there is increasing activity in this 
area as wind farm proponents prepare for the implementation of the REFIT.36  
 
Much of this primary energy is converted to other forms of energy.37 Coal is 
used to generate electricity and produce liquid fuels using Sasol’s coal to liquid 
                                                     
32 Department of Minerals and Energy, Directorate: Energy Planning and Development Digest of 
South African Energy Statistics (2006) at 1. 
33 Coal:72.7 %(2003) and 68%(2004) and crude oil: 13.7% (2003) and 19.4 % (2004) DME Energy 
Statistics (2006) at 2.  The most recent figures (2006) show continuation in trend of slight decrease in 
percentage of energy production from coal (67.21%) versus crude oil (21.93%) although overall 
supply from both in TeraJoules (TJ) has increased. Department of Minerals and Energy, Directorate: 
Energy Planning and Development Digest of South African Energy Statistics (2009) 4 ed at 4. 
34 Some natural gas is converted to liquid fuels in Sasol’s Gas to Liquid process although Sasol Gas 
also supplies natural and processed gas to directly customers for energy and process needs, including 
the cogeneration of electricity and steam at Richards Bay and Newcastle. Sasol is currently investing 
R1.1 billion to increase the natural gas operations by 20% over the next few years. South Africa.info 
Infrastructure: Synthetic Fuels, Oil and Gas.  Available at 
http://www.southafrica.info/business/economy/infrastructure/energy.htm (Accessed 06.09.2011) and 
Sasol Sasol Facts (2009).  Available at 
http://www.sasol.com/sasol_internet/frontend/navigation.jsp?navid=1600033&rootid=2 (Accessed 
06.09.2011). 
35 DME Energy Statistics (2009) at 4.Commercially, typical applications would be the provision of 
process heat through burning bulk from logs, bagasse or black liquor in the sugar and pulp and paper 
industries. Biomass is also used for some domestic purposes, but is difficult to estimate. 
36 Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism South Africa: Initial National Communication 
under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (2004) at 8. 





technology (CTL). Imported crude oil is refined into petroleum products at crude oil 
refineries.  
 
 The predominant energy products produced and consumed in South Africa 
are therefore coal, electricity and petroleum products. Each product roughly accounts 
for one third of the country’s energy consumption in South Africa.38 
 
Coal reserves are abundant and relatively cheap to exploit in South Africa.39 
South Africa is a nett exporter of coal.40 As much as 75 per cent of the total energy 
consumption in 2004 was fuelled by coal.41 About 20 per cent of the coal consumed 
in the domestic market is used in primary form. The rest is used in the production of 
electricity and liquid fuels.42  Industry dominates the consumption of coal both as an 
energy source and as a raw material in the production of secondary energy 
products.43 
 
Electricity provides about 30 per cent of the country’s energy needs.44 The 
main provider is Eskom, a parastatal utility company that supplies more than 95 per 
cent of South Africa’s electricity. It ranks as one of the top seven electricity 
generators in the world and accounts for more than half the energy generated in 
Africa.45 Up until recently, it was one of the four cheapest energy providers in the 
                                                     
38 Department of Minerals and Energy National Energy Efficiency Strategy of the Republic of South 
Africa, First Review October 2008 in GN 908 GG 32342 of 26 June 2009 at 15. 
39 DME Energy Statistics (2006) at 21. 
40 Winkler H (ed) Energy Policies for Sustainable Development: Options for the Future (2006) 
Energy Research Centre, University of Cape Town at 4. 
41South African Government Draft Clean Technology Fund Investment Plan (October 2009) at 3. 
42 55% % to electricity, 21% to petroleum products. Davidson O ‘Energy Policy’ in Winkler Energy 
Policies (2006) at 4. 
43Winkler Energy Policies (2006) at 32. 
44 Energy Efficiency Strategy (2008) at 15. 




world. 46   Electricity is produced mainly from coal-fired power stations. These 
account for 13 of the 24 power stations in South Africa and 32066 Megawatts (MW) 
of electricity production. Nuclear contributes 1800 MW, two pumped storage 
facilities 1200 MW, six hydro-electric stations, 600 MW and two gas turbine stations 
342 MW. 47 
 
Industry is the largest consumer of electricity in South Africa (36 per cent), 
followed by the transport sector (26 per cent). 48  Residential demand has been 
increasing since 1994 and the post- apartheid government’s commitment to 
delivering services to previously disadvantaged sectors of society. 49 
 
South Africa’s petroleum products provide 32 per cent of the country’s 
energy needs50 and are produced from three primary energy sources, namely crude 
oil, coal and some natural gas. About 35 per cent of liquid fuels are produced from 
Sasol’s coal to liquid technology (CTL), 9 per cent from natural gas in Gas to liquid 
(GTL) processes and the bulk from imported51 crude oil.52 There are four crude oil 
refineries53 designed to process a total throughput of 513 000 Barrels per Stream Day 
(BPSD).54 Sasol Secunda is designed to process about 150 000 BPSD55 of coal and 
                                                     
46 DME Energy Statistics (2006) at 38.  
47Department of Energy, Electrification Policy Development and Management Directorate 
Electrification Statistics (2009) at 8. 
48 Ibid. 
49Eskom’s electrification programme has increased the supply of electricity from 30% to 75% of 
households. Electrified households total 9245357. DOE Electrification Statistics (2009) at 10 and 30. 
50 Energy Efficiency Strategy (2008) at 15. 
51 Crude is imported through coastal ports and transported via pipeline to the refineries. Only about 
3% of the crude oil processed is sourced within South Africa. Initial Communication to UNFCCC 
(2004) at 7. 
52 DME Energy Statistics (2006) at 1.  
53 These are Chevron in Cape Town, Engen and Sapref (jointly owned by Shell and BP) in Durban 
and Natref (joint venture between Sasol and Total SA) inland at Sasolburg.  
54 Sum of Chevron (100 000 BPSD); Engen (125 000 BPSD); Natref (108 000 BPSD); Sapref (180 




natural gas in its CTL and GTL plants.56 Petroleum products marketed in South 
Africa are petrol, diesel, jet fuel, illuminating kerosene, fuel oil, bitumen and Liquid 
Petroleum Gas (LPG) and are consumed predominantly in the transport sector.57 The 
liquid fuels industry, comprising crude oil refining and CTL and GTL processes, 
forms a large component of South African industry. These are typically energy-
intensive processes.58  The main use of petroleum products in industry is fuel oil for 
heavy industry.59 
 
Overall, industrial energy consumption forms a large proportion of South 
Africa’s energy supply- and demand complex. The main energy products consumed 
by industry are coal followed by electricity. 60  As such, industrial energy 
consumption is a large component of what drives energy production and therefore 
has a large influence on the South African energy sector.  
 
 
2.2.  Challenges Facing the Domestic Energy Sector 
 
The South African energy sector is currently facing significant challenges. 
Many of these originate from industrial development and energy governance during 
the apartheid era.61 Over the past decade, limited progress has been made towards 
                                                                                                                                                      
55 Crude equivalent at average yield. 
56 Natural gas is imported from the Mozambique Natural Gas fields to Secunda via an 865 km cross 
border pipeline for production of liquid fuels in gas to liquid (GTL) process.  
57 77% transport, 5%residential, 4% commerce, 3% mining, 2% Industry, 2% Non-energy, 1 % other 
from DME Energy Statistics (2006) at 32.  
58 Winkler H, Jooste M & Marquard A ‘Structuring Approaches to Pricing Carbon in Energy-and 
Trade-Intensive Sectors in South Africa’ (2010) 10 Climate Policy 527 at 531. 
59 Winkler Energy Policies (2006) at 31. 
60Based on 2005 DME data, Harald Winkler provides the following breakdown: Coal 51%, electricity 
33 % and petroleum products 12% in Winkler Energy Policies at 32.  
61 Department of Minerals and Energy White Paper on the Energy Policy of the Republic of South 




resolving issues such as the need to restructure the energy sector to allow for 
diversification of supply and improved competition.62 In addition, linked to global as 
well as local change, new challenges now face the sector. These challenges are 
discussed below under the headings: Socio-Economic, Environmental and 
Regulatory Challenges with particular reference to the role that industrial energy 
consumption may play. 
 
2.2.1. Socio-Economic Challenges  
 
The energy sector is central to South Africa’s economic development. 63 
Historically, industrial development in South Africa has been based largely around 
the availability of cheap coal and electricity. Eskom built several coal-based power 
stations in the 1970s and 1980s to the extent that there was an oversupply of 
electricity. The resultant low electricity prices attracted energy-intensive industries 
such as aluminium smelting and deep shaft gold mining to the country and 
contributed much to the economic growth.64 This trend was actively promoted by 
industrial development policy.65  However, the abundant supply of cheap coal and 
electricity did not foster energy efficient consumption within these industries, nor  
other consumers. South African industry is therefore relatively energy-intensive and 
energy inefficient by international standards.66  
 
The need for energy efficient consumption by all sectors, including industry, 
is pushed into focus as energy supply becomes limited. The electricity crisis in 2008 
                                                     
62 Tyler E Aligning South African Energy and Climate Change Mitigation Policy (2009) Energy 
Research Centre, University of Cape Town at 10. 
63 Energy White Paper (1998) at 2. 
64 Winkler (2010) Climate Policy at 529. 
65 Policies existed from as the far back as 1970s. For more information on this topic see Winkler 
(2010) Climate Policy at 529 and Winkler H & Marquard A Analysis of the Economic Implications of 
a Carbon Tax (2009) Energy Research Centre, University of Cape Town at 9. 




highlighted the problem that increased demand has caught up with generation supply 
capacity and that the reserve margin is insufficient to allow for planned maintenance 
and unplanned outages. 67 As described by President Mbeki in his State of the Nation 
address at the annual opening of Parliament in Cape Town in 2008, ‘This situation 
has precipitated the inevitable realization that the era of very cheap and abundant 
electricity has come to an end.’68 Various interventions were developed to address 
the shortfall of capacity. These included  ‘new build’ and ‘return to service’ power 
generation plans (supply side) 69 and demand side management  (DSM) measures 
encapsulated in the Power Conservation Programme (PCP) such as quota allocations, 
penalties and cut-offs, incentives and trading.70   
 
Energy efficiency measures form an important part of the medium to long-
term strategy. 71 While rationing electricity formed a large part of the short-term 
response to the crisis, energy efficiency measures that effectively obtain the same 
economic output for reduced energy input clearly provides a more cost effective 
solution with less detrimental effect to economic development. The longer term plans 
for the proposed power generation expansion requires significant capital 
investment. 72  Energy efficiency improvements could postpone the need for 
additional power stations by three to four years according to one study.73 
 
                                                     
67  South African Government National Response to South Africa’s Electricity Shortage  (Jan 2008) at 
5. Available at http://www.info.gov.za/otherdocs/2008/resp_elec.pdf (Accessed 06.09.2011). 
68 Timberg C ‘Government at Fault in S. Africa's Electricity Crisis, Mbeki Says’ 9 February 2008 
Washington Post. 
69 See details of planned capacity expansion in SA Response to Electricity Crisis (2008) 
at 7-9. 
70 SA Response to Electricity Crisis (2008) at 11-12. 
71 Goal 8: Reduce the necessity for additional power generation capacity. Energy Efficiency Strategy 
(2008) at 13.  
72 The World Bank approved a loan of $3.75 billion to Eskom to fund this programme. Rastello S and 
Lourens C ‘Eskom Gets $3.75 Billion World Bank Loan for Coal-Fired Plant’ 9 April 2010 
Bloomberg Business Day. 




The National Electricity Response Team (NERT) was set up in December 
2008 to coordinate the various initiatives and report to Cabinet through its steering 
committee.74 However, the downturn in the economy and consequent reduction in 
power demand has led to a ‘“false sense of security” about the state of electricity 
supply in South Africa’.75 In the interim, neither of the coordinating bodies set up to 
respond to the crisis (namely the Electricity Advisory Committee and NERT) has 
been meeting as required to progress the response initiatives and the concern remains 
that as the country recovers from the recession, it will be faced by similar power 
constraints.76  
 
Apart from the economic driver of decreased energy costs, the need for 
energy efficient consumption is also justified when the social and environmental 
impacts of energy consumption are taken into account.77  
 
From a social impact perspective, a legacy of the apartheid era was that 
modern energy services were available mainly to industry and a small section of the 
population.78 The energy supply industry was also limited to a few companies.79 The 
post-apartheid government of 1994 initiated an electrification programme with 
Eskom to provide more equitable access to electricity. There has been significant 
progress in that electricity supply has been extended from 30 to 75 per cent of 
households in the ensuing period.80 However, some of the other socio–economic 
challenges remain. The progress towards diversifying energy supply and improving 
                                                     
74 Creamer T ‘South Africa Has to Show Greater Power-Crisis Urgency’ 15 Jan 2010 Engineering 
News. 
75 Citing Trevor Manual, Minister in the Presidency responsible for the National Planning 
Commission. Creamer (2010). 
76Creamer (2010). 
77 Spalding-Fecher R and Matibe DK ’Electricity and Externalities in South Africa’ (2003) 31 Energy 
Policy 72. 
78 Winkler Energy Policies (2006) at 6. 
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economic efficiency through increased competition in the sector has been very 
slow.81 The failure to include the costs involved in providing equitable electricity 
services and opening up the energy supply sector to new entrants, such as 
independent renewable energy generators, has contributed to the current energy 
sector realities. 
  
2.2.2. Environmental Challenges 
 
Another growing concern that regulators of the energy sector face is the 
urgent need to reform environmental performance. Historically, low income 
consumers have been subject to potential health risks from indoor and outdoor 
pollution from the combustion of coal and fuel wood.82 In the ensuing years, air 
pollution, especially in relation to greenhouse gas emissions has gained prominence 
as a global environmental focus.83 As the energy sector, particularly the industrial 
energy consumption component is a major contributor to air pollution and GHG 
emissions in South Africa, these particular issues are discussed in detail below.  
 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
 
SA is a signatory to United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC)84 and the Kyoto Protocol.85 As such the country is committed to 
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82 Energy White Paper (1998) at 26. 
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Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).  
84 South Africa ratified the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
adopted at the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, 1992 in 1997. Department of Environmental Affairs 
and Tourism Ratification of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in 
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the global effort to stabilise greenhouse gas (GHG) emission levels (mitigation) and 
respond to the impacts of climate change (adaption). South Africa participates in the 
UNFCCC/Kyoto arena as a developing country and in line with the ‘common, but 
differentiated responsibility’86 approach, has not been required to take on a legally 
binding reduction target. However, after the 2009 negotiations at Copenhagen, the 
country has made public the intention to ‘take nationally appropriate mitigation 
action to enable 34% deviation below the ‘Business as Usual’ emissions growth 
trajectory by 2020 and 42% deviation below the ‘Business as Usual’ emissions 
growth trajectory by 2025.87  
 
The scale of the South Africa’s mitigation challenge is informed by two GHG 
inventories. 88 A summary of the sector trend data published in August 2009 is shown 
below: 
 
Table 1: Sector Emissions Trend and Percentage change from 199089  
 
                                                     
86 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 1992, Article 3.1. 
87 Department of Environment Affairs (Alf Wills) letter to Executive Secretary of UNFCCC 29 
January 2010. Available at http://unfccc.int/meetings/items/5276.php.  (Accessed 10.09.2011). 
88 Greenhouse gas emissions were estimated for 1990 and 1994 Department of Environmental Affairs 
and Tourism Initial GHG inventory Report of South Africa (2004) prepared for submission with the 
Initial Communication to UNFCCC (2004) and recently for 2000. Department of Environment Affairs 
and Tourism Draft National Greenhouse Gas Inventory for the Republic of South Africa: Invitation 
for written representations and/or objections in GN 1104 GG 32490 of 12 August 2009.   




A comparison of the results shows an increase of about 25.6 per cent in the 
country’s total emissions over the ten year period. The energy sector is by far the 
largest contributor to GHG in South Africa (75.1-78.9 per cent) and is following an 
increasing trend relative to other sectors.90 There is considerable scope to reduce 
South Africa’s overall GHG emissions by targeting the energy sector in particular. 
Further to this, most emissions from the energy sector are associated with energy 
consumption through the combustion of fuel. Industry accounts for 83 per cent of 
greenhouse gas emissions from fuel combustion, the bulk from the energy industry 
itself and a smaller contribution from manufacturing and construction industries.91 
Therefore improving energy efficiency in industry has the potential to address a 
considerable portion of the total GHG emissions in South Africa. This is depicted in 
the chart below that shows the contribution by sector as determined in the 2000 
inventory.92  
 
                                                     
90 Agriculture and Waste sectors show decreasing trends while industrial and energy sector reflect 
increasing trends. Some of the changes however are considered to be more of an attribute of 
differences in IPPC estimation methodologies and sector classification used for the different 
inventories as opposed to real changes. 
91 Government of South Africa Background Information and Discussion Document to facilitate the 
Climate Change Policy Engagement (2010) Revision 5.0 at 21. 




Figure 1: The South African greenhouse gas emission profile, base year 2000 (Department of 
Environmental Affairs, 2009) 93 
 
The high emissions from the energy sector are mainly attributed to the 
energy-intensive nature of South Africa’s industry and the predominant use of coal to 
supply the country’s energy needs. 94 The combustion of coal results in the highest 
GHG emissions out of the range of fossil fuels. In this sense, the South African 
energy sector is emission or carbon intensive as well as energy-intensive.95 
 
The inventory data points clearly to the energy sector as a focus area for 
efforts aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Increased energy efficiency and 
switching away from fossil fuels are key mitigation strategies and identified in 




Industrial energy consumption also impacts on air quality in parts of South 
Africa. There are a number of other air pollutants related to power generation and 
other industry’s reliance on fossil fuels. In particular, sulphur dioxide (SO2), 
nitrogen oxide (NOx) and particulate matter (PM) are emitted from the combustion 
of low grade coal97 and crude oil in the production of electricity and petroleum 
                                                     
93 Climate Change BID (2010) at 21. 
94 See chapter 2.1. 
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Technical Summary (2007) Department of Environment Affairs and Tourism, Pretoria; Energy 
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products.98 High particulate emissions are also caused by coal mining operations.99 
These pollutants are associated with health impacts such as respiratory illness.100 In 
addition, SO2 and NOx may cause acidic deposition, commonly referred to as ‘acid 
rain’.101  In South Africa, the air quality in areas such as the Vaal Triangle does not 
meet the national ambient air quality standards,102 mainly due to emissions from 
power stations, petroleum and petrochemical industries, mining and other 
industries.103  
 
In summary, industrial energy consumption is responsible for a large part of 
the environmental challenges of climate change and air pollution. As a high 
proportion of industrial emissions is associated with the combustion of fuels to 
provide energy, either at power stations or at industrial sites, increased energy 
efficiency would have the ‘co-benefit’ of reduced pollution and GHG.104 Therefore, 
improved industrial energy efficiency is absolutely central to both global and local 
attempts to address pollution.  
 
                                                     
98  SAPIA (2008) at 38; Minimum emissions standards were set SO2, NOx and PM for various 
industries including Power Generation and Petroleum Industries under Department of Environmental 
Affairs and Tourism National Environmental Management: Air Quality Act 39 of 2004:List of 
Activities which Result in Atmospheric Emissions which Have or May Have a Significant Detrimental 
Effect on the Environment, including Health, Social Conditions, Economic Conditions, Ecological 
Conditions or Cultural Heritage in GN 248 GG 33064 of 31 March 2010. 
99 Winkler Energy Policies (2006) at 16. 
100 Spalding-Fecher and Matibe (2003) at 724 
101 Ibid. 
102 Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism National Environmental Management: Air 
Quality Act (39/2004): National Ambient Air Quality Standards in GN 1210 GG 32816 of 24 
December 2009. 
103 Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism National Environmental Management: Air 
Quality Act (39/2004): Vaal Triangle Air-Shed Priority Area Air Quality Management Plan in GNR 
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2.2.3. Regulatory Challenges 
 
Since the inclusion of the ‘environmental right’ in the Constitution, 105 there 
has been a rapid development of legislation to give effect to the government’s 
imperative to provide a regulatory system that supports ‘an environment that is not 
harmful to human health or well-being’.106 New laws governing water, waste and air 
quality management are likely to result in a step change in operational and capital 
expenditure by industry to meet their environmental obligations.107 Emerging climate 
change and energy policy and legislation may add to this burden. 
 
Many of the South Africa’s environmental laws rely on a command-and-
control approach. Authorisations, licenses or minimum standards are set and failure 
to comply attracts legal consequences.108 This form of regulation tends to be overly 
prescriptive and inflexible and ultimately costly to both regulator and regulated, 
usually industry in the local context. The regulator must have sufficient capacity to 
administer and enforce legislation and there is often little scope for industry to adopt 
most cost effective measures to achieve environmental objectives.109  
 
                                                     
105 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
106 Section 24. 
107 These laws include National Water Act 36 of 1998; National Environmental Management Air 
Quality Act 39 of 2004; National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998; National 
Environmental Management: Integrated Coastal Management Act 24 of 2008; National 
Environmental Management: Waste Act 59 of 2008. 
108 Kleynhans and Kotze estimate at least 25 laws some form of authorisation. Kleynhans EPJ and 
Kotze LJ ‘A Critical Analysis of the Effect of South African Environmental Legislation on the 
International Competitiveness of Local Industries’ (2008) 15 (2) SAJELP 245 at 263. Some examples 
of legislation see note 108. 
109 Kleynhans and Kotze (2008) at 264; Paterson AR ‘Pruning the Money Tree to Ensure Sustainable 





In South Africa, the drawbacks of the command-and-control approach are 
heightened by institutional and legislative fragmentation where environmental laws 
are administered and enforced across different levels and departments within the 
government. 110  Effective regulation around energy-related environmental issues 
requires a high level of cooperative governance between the Department of 
Environmental Affairs and the Department of Minerals Resources and the 
Department of Energy (the latter two formerly combined into the Department of 
Minerals and Energy (DME)).111 In the past, this has been largely lacking with DME 
priorities being focused on economic development. Lack of capacity in both energy 
and environmental departments adds to the inefficiencies and delays caused by the 
duplication and unclear separation of roles. 112  This has resulted in a negative 
perception within industry that environmental laws are difficult and costly to comply 
with as they are unclear and there is insufficient guidance. 113  Overall, industry 
perceives that current environmental regulations impact negatively on South African 
industry’s international competitiveness.114   
 
The command-and-control approach and institutional fragmentation also 
impact negatively on the promotion of energy efficiency. Several institutions have 
been put in place since 1994 to coordinate energy planning and promote energy 
efficiency. These include the National Energy Regulator of South Africa (NERSA) 
in 1995, DME’s National Energy Efficiency Agency (NEEA) in 2006, the South 
African National Development Institute (SANEDI) 115  and the National Energy 
Response Team (NERT) in 2008. However, these bodies are viewed as under 
resourced and hampered by unclear mandates.116 
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 Several commentators suggest market-based instruments (MBIs) may 
provide a more appropriate and cost-effective means of overcoming the 
inefficiencies and high costs of South Africa’s traditional command-and-control 
approach.117 As the concept of energy efficiency is based fundamentally on the use 
of the economic market, the promotion of energy efficiency lends itself to the use of 
MBIs as a regulatory approach. Energy efficiency means that the same output is 
achieved with less energy input. The saving in energy equates to cost savings 
commensurate with the price of the energy used. Energy pricing that reflects social, 
economic and environmental costs is fundamental to energy efficiency.118 
 
In summary, it is clear that South Africa is facing significant socio-economic 
and environmental challenges associated with the energy sector. These are 
compounded by regulatory challenges. Improved energy efficiency measures in 
industry are central to any strategy to addressing these concerns. The low price of 
energy has traditionally been one of the main barriers to the development of energy 
efficient industry in South Africa.119 Therefore, it is not surprising that the South 
African government is turning to MBIs as a tool to overcome these challenges.120 
Before considering the extent to which SA has done so and what options exist for 
extending their use, we need to understand what MBIs are and the theoretical 
benefits, disadvantages and prerequisites that underlie their successful introduction.  
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118 Energy Efficiency Strategy (2008) at 34. 
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3. The Case for Market-Based Instruments in Environmental 
Regulation 
 
In the last few years market-based instruments (MBIs) have been become 
increasingly popular both locally and internationally as a means of achieving 
environmental objectives. Much has been written on the theory underlying the use of 
such mechanisms and their advantages and disadvantages. 121  This chapter 
summarises the theoretical basis for MBIs and how they can support governments 
and industries to achieve environmental objectives such as improving energy 
efficiency and reducing GHG pollution.  
 
3.1. What are MBIs? 
 
MBIs are a range of measures that governments can introduce to attempt to 
attach a cost to environmental goods (such as clean air and water) or to influence 
                                                     
121 This section draws on a sample of writings on the subject. Paterson A ‘Incentive-Based Measures’ 
in A Paterson A and Kotze LJ (eds) Environmental Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa: 
Legal Perspectives (2009) 232-321; Stavins R 'Experience with Market-Based Environmental Policy 
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Incentives for Environmental Protection – Introduction’ (1994) 1 SAJELP 49; Henderson PGW 
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behaviour through market signals.122 In South Africa, the National Treasury defines 
MBIs as ‘a group of policy instruments that seek to correct environmentally-related 
market failures through the price mechanism.’123 Similarly, Stavins defines MBIs as 
‘regulations that encourage behaviours through market signals rather than through 
explicit directives regarding pollution control levels or methods.’124 
 
Analysts suggest that to a large extent pollution and environmental 
degradation, such as those outlined in the previous chapter, have come about as a 
consequence of the incorrect pricing of environmental goods.125 Traditionally, these 
resources have been viewed as common goods, owned by all, and therefore not 
considered in the overall cost of production and consumption. As a result hidden 
costs to society and the environment, such as health impacts from pollution and 
increased scarcity of resources for future generations, are not reflected in the market 
price of the finished product. 126  Given that the market is theoretically the most 
efficient means of distributing scarce resources, this failure to adequately account for 
environmental costs has been termed ‘market failure’.127  
 
In terms of the South African energy sector, ‘market failure’ is clearly linked 
to the historical processes of industrial development outlined in the last chapter that 
privileged the generation of cheap electricity from coal, thus fostering the growth of 
high energy-intensity industries and low energy efficiency practices both in industry 
and households. As discussed in chapter 2, until recently, and arguably even today, 
energy prices have not reflected the costs to the environment, particularly in terms of 
air quality and greenhouse gas emissions and drove what is increasingly understood 
as undesirable energy inefficient behaviour. 
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In cases where the market failure results in unacceptable consequences such 
as environmental degradation or unsustainable resource use, there is a strong case for 
governments to intervene to address the market failure.128 One of the most effective 
intervention options is the use of MBIs which have been described as ‘harnessing 
market forces’ to achieve environmental goals by providing an economic driver for 
pollution control within industry.129 
 
MBIs are categorized in various ways by commentators and analysts.130 The 
scheme described by Paterson 131  is used here to summarise the types of MBIs 
commonly employed in environmental management. There are broadly two main 
categories of MBIs, those that create new markets and those that use existing 
markets. This dissertation focuses on the latter as described in the chapter 1. 
 
3.1.1. MBIs that Create New Markets 
 
MBIs that create new markets attempt to improve environmental performance 
by allocating ownership rights to environmental goods such as clean air or water. 
These rights generally take the form of tradable permits or certificates. A cap is set 
on the overall use of the environmental good, usually a maximum allowable quantity 
in terms of emissions or discharge volume or the exploitation of natural resources. A 
market of tradable permits or rights is then set up to determine the apportionment of 
the allowance amongst those competing for the use of this good. 132  These 
instruments are often referred to as ‘Cap and Trade’ programmes. The most common 
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(1995); Stavins (2003) 360- 361; EEA (2005) at 6. 
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examples are emission trading systems (ETS) to manage air quality 133  and 
greenhouse gas emissions.134 There are some examples of energy savings trading 
schemes such as the Right to Consume (RTC) trial scheme implemented by Eskom 
as a response to the electricity crisis in 2008.135 ETS are theoretically an efficient 
means of reducing emissions or improving energy efficiency particularly where a 
specific reduction target must be achieved, but there are a number of pitfalls and 
design issues that must be considered for effective implementation. Much has been 
written on the subject,136 but it is not discussed in depth here as the scope of the 
dissertation is delimited to MBIs that use existing markets.  
 
3.1.2. MBIs Using Existing Markets 
 
MBIs that use existing markets form the focus of this dissertation. This 
category encompasses a range of instruments that build on markets and pricing 
structures that already exist. MBIs that use existing markets can be negative or 
positive in nature.137 Those labelled as ‘positive’ MBIs provide an incentive for firms 
                                                     
133 Examples are Acid Rain program, NOx Budget Trading program and various regional air quality 
trading schemes such as ‘Regional Clean Air Incentives Market (RECLAIM)’. For more see Stavins 
(2003). 
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to take action to improve environmental performance. In contrast, what have become 





Negative MBIs aim to impose costs on activities that impact detrimentally on 
the environment. In this regard, they give effect to the ‘polluter pays’ principle and 
internalise costs associated with environmental degradation or depletion of natural 
resources. 139  These usually take the form of pollution charge systems; 140  user 
charges; license fees; product taxes and performance bonds.141 Some commentators 
also include liability rules and compensation schemes and the removal of ‘perverse 
subsidies’ as MBIs that would fall within this category.142 Each of these is briefly 
discussed below:  
 
Pollution charges such as emission, effluent and disposal charges incentivise 
action to reduce pollution by charging per unit mass or concentration of pollutant 
emitted. 143  Revenue generated may be ‘earmarked’ to support environmental 
management, monitoring or enforcement.144  
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User charges are imposed to finance specific environmental services by 
charging those who benefit from them.145 Users (both companies and individuals) are 
charged for the use of environmental goods and public amenities such as municipal 
waste collection, water use or access to national parks. The idea is that 
environmental and administrative costs associated with environmental management 
are passed on to the user. However, reduction of consumption or impact on resources 
is only really encouraged if differential rates are imposed on the use of goods more 
in line with pollution charges described above.146  
 
License fees are administrative charges that share some similarity with user 
fees, but typically are associated with legislation that allows for the licensing of 
‘environmentally deleterious activities’ including air, water and waste disposal 
permits among others; the exploitation of natural resources such as minerals or 
marine and terrestrial living resources; and commonly used products that negatively 
impact the environment such as vehicles. License fees finance license administration 
and may act in some way to internalise environmental costs and promote ‘cleaner 
production’.147 
 
Product taxes or levies are placed on certain environmentally deleterious 
products such as plastic bags, and transport fuels to internalise the costs of pollution 
and steer environment–friendly consumer behaviour. Revenue generated may be 
used for environmental management. 148  The electricity levy introduced in South 
Africa is an example of a product tax.149 
 
Performance bonds involve companies posting sums of money as a bond or 
guarantee against meeting specified targets or standards. The company is encouraged 
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to meet these targets to recover the bond (or part thereof), and if it fails to do so, the 
bond finances the State to rectify any environmental damage caused by the failure.150 
 
Liability rules and compensation schemes may also provide an economic 
incentive to companies to implement control measures that reduce the risk of 
environmental incidents. For example, in certain jurisdictions, companies are faced 
with large payouts for clean up or compensation in the case of oil spills or to address 
waste site remediation liabilities. In some cases these potential costs affect the price 
of the commodity. 151  Payment into statutory funds and fines fall within this 
category.152 
 
Reducing subsidies that adversely impact the environment is also an option 
within the implementation of MBIs.153 Although these ‘perverse subsidies’ are often 
originally implemented to achieve specific goals such as support industrial growth or 
promote employment, unintended impacts to society and the environment may in 
practice outweigh the expected benefits.154  During international sanctions against 
apartheid, Sasol’s Coal to Liquid (CTL) process was subsidised as part of the 
strategy to make South Africa self sufficient in terms of energy.155 Although this 
subsidy has been phased out, it allowed Sasol to develop the technology and 
expertise required by ensuring it remained competitive against oil refining 
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competitors.156  From an environmental perspective though, CTL is an inefficient 




Using existing markets, there are a number of instruments that are positive in 
the sense that they aim to persuade companies or individuals to reduce their 
environmental impact by rewarding them in some way. Although they may influence 
companies to improve environmental performance, positive incentives do not fulfil 
the objective of internalising environmental costs, nor do they generate revenue. In a 
way, they would appear to be in contravention of the polluter pays principle.158 
However, as Henderson notes:  
 
 ‘An exception to the polluter pays principle could be considered where 
industries have been developed within the framework of a particular 
environmental knowledge and technological state, and where the industry is 
then required to change it’s technology, processes or operations in order to 
comply with new environmental requirements. In this case an argument may be 
advanced for the State providing an incentive for a transitional period.’159  
 
There are three main types of positive incentive, namely, direct subsidies, deposit-
refund schemes and tax benefits.160 
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Subsidies are typically used to support specific activities that are deemed to 
be strategic and beneficial to society, but would not be economically viable within 
the free market. Historically, they have been used to support vulnerable industries, 
bolster local production against international competition or protect employment.161 
Nowadays, they are being used more frequently to foster environmental programs 
such as the development of renewable energy technology. 162  Direct subsidies 163 
generally take the form of financial assistance by the State to companies or 
individuals in order to reduce costs for consumers or producers below the market 
level.164 
 
Deposit–refund systems are used to encourage recycling and reuse of 
products whose disposal may be damaging to the environment. Typical products 
targeted in these schemes are packaging, used oil and tyres. A user charge is placed 
on the product, but a refund is available as a positive incentive to return the product 
to the collection point for reuse or recycling. 
 
The tax system can also be used to encourage certain activities that are 
beneficial to the environment such as investing in clean technology or fostering the 
sustainable use of natural resources.165 These may operate through the existing tax 
system using tax instruments such as income tax, property tax, excise taxes, capital 
gains tax and estate duties.166 Environmental tax benefits may take different forms, 
namely, differentiation or reductions; rebates; exemptions; accelerated depreciation 
allowances and deductions. Some examples of tax benefits in South Africa are the 
energy efficiency and additional investment allowances under s12 of South Africa’s 
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Income Tax Act that aim to promote energy efficiency.167  The differentiation of 
product or sales taxes on product alternatives may also be used to encourage the use 
of environmentally preferred products such as unleaded petrol available at a reduced 
cost relative to leaded gasoline in Europe in the mid 1980s to mid 1990s.168 This 
differentiation takes the form of a reduction on the excise taxes of specific products. 
 
3.2. What are the Positives and Disadvantages of MBIs? 
 
From the discussion above, it is obvious that there is a range of MBIs 
available to the regulator that may be designed and implemented to fit specific 
objectives. The next section discusses the main advantages and disadvantages that 
MBIs have in common when compared to other regulatory options such as 
command-and-control approaches or information strategies.  
 
An obvious benefit of MBIs in general is that they are arguably the most cost 
effective means of achieving environmental objectives. In theory, if appropriately 
designed and implemented, the desired environmental improvement is achieved at 
the least cost to society as a whole.169 Abatement is undertaken by those who can do 
so at least cost.170 As industries differ in age, technology and complexity, these 
abatement costs can vary significantly between facilities. In contrast, direct 
regulation,171 in the form of uniform emission or technology standards, requires that 
all those who fall within the regulated category must achieve these standards 
regardless of cost.172 Theoretically, direct regulation can be applied in such a way 
that emission abatement is achieved cost effectively. In practice, however, regulators 
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168 Stavins (2003) at  389. 
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would require detailed information at a company level and this is seldom 
available.173   
 
MBIs aim to improve the price signal to internalise environmental costs and 
influence behaviour. This means that decisions that may affect environmental 
performance are considered on the same basis as any other investment or operational 
cost opportunities. If MBIs are not used as a regulatory tool, environmental impact 
considerations are weighed against financial implications in a more subjective 
process. Command-and-control regulation may ensure that standards are met, but 
they do nothing to encourage performance that exceeds the standards.174 A properly 
designed MBI gives a price signal to economically justify companies undertaking 
pollution control activities to the extent that overall environmental objectives are 
met.  
 
As MBIs do not specify technology or emission standards, they allow for 
more flexibility in company level response. 175 Companies have more discretion with 
regards to investment timeframes and abatement technologies that are best suited to 
their particular circumstances. As direct regulation is often based on installing 
abatement technologies that are currently available, 176  they tend to hamper the 
development of new or innovative abatement technologies. MBIs are believed to be 
more conducive to ‘technological innovation’.177 
 
As described earlier, negative MBIs give effect to the ‘polluter pays’ 
principle and may be used to raise revenue for the Treasury or earmarked for 
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environmental expenditure, depending on the type and design of instrument.178 In 
some jurisdictions, revenue generated from environmental taxes has been used to 
offset a reduction in income taxes.179 This is known as the ‘double dividend’ effect 
as social welfare is improved at the same time as achieving environmental 
objectives.180 In addition, there may be positive benefits for employment if labour 
taxes are reduced, a so-called ‘triple dividend’.181 
 
Taxes and charges provide a ‘dynamic incentive’ to environmental 
improvement and raise revenue, but the overall outcome is uncertain. 182 However, 
they provide information on market response to environmental price signals. They 
have been used successfully as trials to gather data for the design of ETS and 
environmental taxes.183 
 
Subsidies do not generate revenue or give effect to the polluter pays 
principle, but can be used to shape behaviour. They are often effective for building 
up fledgling industries that are strategic to environmental policy184 and for providing 
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the right price signal in the market.185 As discussed above, care should be taken to 
avoid creating perverse incentives.  
 
Liability and compensation schemes ensure that polluters pay for 
environmental damage. In some cases, the costs of insurance or remediation fund 
contributions are reflected in the price signal. The limiting factor of these as effective 
MBIs is the often drawn out and expensive legal process associated with liability 
claims.186 
 
There are some potential drawbacks to the use of MBIs. There is less 
certainty in the outcome when MBIs are used as opposed to direct regulation 
methods.187 If the price signal is not strong enough, there may not be enough of an 
economic incentive to change behaviour. If the price signal is too high, the economy 
as a whole may be adversely affected.  
 
There are also concerns regarding the impact that MBIs may have on 
equity.188 Although the justification for building the environmental costs into the 
price of goods is clear, there is a concern that necessities such as water and energy 
will become unaffordable to poorer households. There are ways of overcoming this 
effect through rebates, subsidies or graduated pricing structures that allow for basic 
minimum consumption.189 
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MBIs may, in addition, impact on the competitiveness of industry, both 
internationally and sometimes regionally within the domestic market. 190  If 
environmental externalities are included in the price of goods in one country, but not 
in those of their international competitors, the foreign trading parties will have an 
economic advantage. This potential shortcoming is not unique to MBIs. To some 
extent any environmental regulatory approach may impact on competitiveness and is 
certainly perceived by industry to do so.191 It stands to reason that the most cost-
effective means of environmental regulation is desirable to limit competiveness 
effects. Therefore, MBIs may be favoured over other approaches in this regard. In 
addition, instruments may be designed to reduce the impact on competition by 
adjusting excise taxes or exempting or subsidising vulnerable industries. Care should 
be taken though to ensure that the overall scheme is not rendered ineffective by 
overprotecting industries.192 
 
3.3. What are the Theoretical Prerequisites for their Successful 
Introduction? 
 
There are a number of characteristics and underlying principles that have 
been shown to be prerequisite to the successful implementation of MBIs. Overall the 
principles of good taxation, namely efficiency, equity, certainty, simplicity and cost 
minimization, underpin the desirability of any financial instrument. 193  These 
principles and characteristics form criteria that can be used to evaluate the likely 
success of MBIs.194 The criteria specified by the South African Treasury for the 
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evaluation of instruments targeting environmental objectives 195 are used here as 
headings. These are environmental effectiveness, certainty, technical and 
administrative aspects, tax revenue, support for the tax, legislative aspects, 
competitiveness, distributional impacts and adjoining policy areas.196 
 
Environmental effectiveness: The MBI must be environmentally effective.197 
A clear policy framework is required to set environmental objectives and the 
boundaries within which such interventions should operate.198 A rational link must 
exist between the instrument and the intended environmental outcome199 and it is 
important that the results are quantifiable if success is to be measured.200 
 
Certainty: Certainty is desirable in terms of environmental outcomes, price 
stability and MBI design. Price stability provides companies certainty and 
confidence to invest in abatement technology as payback can be assessed.201 For the 
same reason, care should be taken to limit changes to MBI design.202 
 
Technical and administrative aspects: To be effective and overcome potential 
shortfalls, MBIs must be properly designed. The technical design should incorporate 
the principles of simplicity, certainty, flexibility and ease of implementation. 203 
Trials are often useful to develop market response information prior to design. 
Flexibility with respect to timing and technology options generally supports more 
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successful results. It is imperative that environmentally acceptable alternatives are 
available where behaviour change is driven by MBIs.204  
 
Administration aspects are key to determining the ease with which MBIs are 
implemented. Experience with the design and implementation of MBIs is often 
lacking within environmental departments of both government institutions and 
industry. Typically, environmental staff has a better understanding of traditional 
command-and-control approaches than financial markets and a mind-set change is 
needed to leverage the full benefits provided by MBIs.205 In terms of regulatory 
administration, environmental taxes are implemented through existing tax systems 
and require very little additional institutional capacity. In South Africa the tax system 
is robust and well capacitated and efficiently administered by the South African 
Revenue Services (SARS).206 Monitoring and enforcement is still required, but may 
need to take a different form.207 
 
Tax revenue: For those MBIs that generate revenue through taxes or levies, 
there are a number of considerations that should be taken into account. The most 
important issue is setting the tax rate at the optimum level to achieve the desired 
effect without overburdening the economy. Exemptions should be kept to a 
minimum.208 From a design perspective, tax rates should be indexed to inflation to 
avoid erosion of their effectiveness over time.209 Normally taxes are levied on goods 
where demand is inelastic. This means that the increased price does not reduce 
demand for the good. However, when an MBI is implemented to promote efficient 
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consumption, ‘elastic’ goods210 should be taxed.211 Earmarking of funds for specific 
environmental programs is possible as described above.  
 
Support for the tax: MBIs that are supported by stakeholders are far more 
likely to be effective. Those that focus on issues that have general support 212 and 
where the benefits are clear and responsibilities well defined tend to be more 
politically attractive. 213  Stakeholder engagement processes and adequate advance 
warning of planned schemes is crucial to successful implementation. Pilot or 
phasing-in schemes may be used to build stakeholder engagement and support.214 
 
Legislative aspects: Legislative aspects are fundamental to the functioning of 
MBIs. In South Africa a sound environmental legislative framework has been set in 
place with the implementation of the National Environmental Management Act 107 
of 1998 (NEMA) and associated sector-specific acts.215 When MBIs are put in place, 
further regulations are required to clearly define rules and allocate responsibilities. 
Transparency in this regard is particularly important for promoting stakeholder buy-
in216 and to avoid manipulation by influential stakeholders.217  
 
Competitiveness: Competitiveness is often viewed as a barrier to the 
implementation of MBIs and must be addressed. A realistic stance by regulators is 
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needed to avoid undermining the effectiveness of measures through overprotection of 
industry. Industry pressure groups may overstate their case in stakeholder 
engagement.218  
 
Distributional effects: Distributional effects must also be considered for the 
effective implementation of MBIs to ensure that impacts are equitable and that 
poorer households are not unduly affected. 219  
 
Adjoining policy areas: The impacts of proposed MBIs on adjoining policy 
areas must also be considered. Care must be taken that the behaviour change 
associated with MBIs fits in with the broader policy framework and socio-economic 
goals of the country. Policy, legal and institutional alignment is necessary to avoid 
unwanted impacts and perverse incentives.220 In some instances, trade-offs may be 
necessary and should be evaluated using impact assessment techniques.221 For the 
successful implementation of MBIs to address environmental challenges in the 
energy sector, cooperative governance between regulators in several policy areas is 
crucial.222 National, provincial and local government governing energy, environment, 
industry and fiscal matters all have a role to play. 
 
In conclusion, the theory establishes a case for MBIs as useful tools to drive 
environmental objectives. There is a range of complex and diverse MBIs available 
within the broad classification and these may be tailored to achieve a specific aim 
such as the promotion of energy efficiency. There are several general prerequisites 
that underpin their successful implementation. Key among these is that there should 
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be a clear policy and regulatory framework in place. 223  Policy establishes 
environmental objectives and direction and enabling legislation must be developed to 
implement MBIs. The following chapter describes South African policy relevant to 
energy efficiency in industry and the potential use of MBIs in this context. MBIs that 
have been enacted through legislation to promote energy efficiency in industry are 
thereafter critically assessed in chapter 5.  
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4. An Overview of the Domestic Policy Framework Relating to 
Efficient Energy Consumption in Industry 
 
The challenges presented by the domestic energy sector have been recognised 
by South Africa’s policy-makers and response actions have been included in the 
formulation of various policies. In particular, energy efficiency measures have been 
proposed in a number of environmental, energy and fiscal policies and strategies. In 
many instances, the use of market-based instruments (MBIs) is considered to support 
these measures. This chapter briefly reviews relevant South African policy to 
highlight the increasing policy focus on the promotion of energy efficiency in 
industry and the possible use of MBIs as a regulatory tool to achieve this objective. 
 
4.1. Environmental policies 
 
The post-apartheid government initiated the development of a new national 
environmental policy that culminated in the release of the White Paper on 
Environmental Management Policy for South Africa (Environmental Management 
Policy) 224  in 1998. It was aimed at providing an overarching environmental 
framework policy to inform the development of sectoral policies and environmental 
governance across all government departments.225 It sets out the then Department of 
Environment Affairs and Tourism’s vision of achieving sustainable development in 
South Africa through a holistic and integrated environmental management 
approach. 226  The Environmental Management Policy identified that previous 
development policies had done little to promote energy efficiency in industry and 
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households227 and highlighted the need to promote energy efficiency to enable the 
sustainable use of energy resources.228 In the industrial sector, the Environmental 
Management Policy pointed to some of the Department of Minerals and Energy’s 
plans for the establishment of Energy Services companies (ESCOs) and an Energy 
Efficiency Agency to support the environmental management policy objectives.229 
The Environmental Management Policy promotes the use of MBIs as part of a 
package of regulatory tools that could be used by Government to internalise the costs 
of environmental damage, 230  achieve environmental improvements and  promote 
sustainable resource use.231 
 
South Africa has been in the process of developing a climate change response 
strategy since ratifying the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC)232 in 1997.233 As part of this effort, the Long term mitigation 
scenario (LTMS) 234 study in 2006 modelled the GHG emissions for a number of 
economic scenarios. The LTMS identified improved industrial energy efficiency as 
having the largest scope for mitigation with an overall positive economic effect.235 
The ‘Use the Market’ scenario incorporates the wide-scale adoption of MBIs to 
promote energy efficiency and renewable energy.236 As this scenario predicts the 
most successful GHG mitigation, the use of MBIs and the potential of improved 
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industrial energy efficiency have become an important aspect of developing climate 
change policy. 
 
The results of the LTMS formed the basis of the Cabinet’s policy approach to 
reduce GHG along a ‘peak, plateau and decline’ emission trajectory. The approach 
advocates that GHG emissions stop growing (start of plateau) in 2020-25 and begin 
declining in absolute terms (end of plateau) in 2030-35.237 Figure 2 below depicts 
this strategy against the LTMS scenarios.238  
Figure 2: Cabinet’s peak, plateau and decline trajectory239 
 
South Africa’s commitment to the ‘peak, plateau, decline’ approach has been 
confirmed in the international context by the country’s submission to the UNFCCC 
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to reduce emissions by 34% by 2020 and 42% by 2050 from business as usual 
predictions. 240 
 
Local policy development continues in order to realise the international 
commitment. In May 2010, the Background Information and Discussion Document 
to facilitate the Climate Change Policy Engagement (Climate Change BID)241 was 
issued, followed by the National Climate Change Response Green Paper (Climate 
Change Green Paper) 242 gazetted for public comment in November. The Climate 
Change BID and the Climate Change Green Paper presents the government’s vision 
regarding appropriate response action and identifies the energy and industrial sectors 
along with transport as key mitigation areas.243 Energy efficiency and the transition 
to renewable forms of energy are the main target areas.244  
 
With regards to industrial energy efficiency, significant scope has been 
identified for improved demand side energy management and energy efficient 
technology in both energy and non-energy industries.245 To this end, MBIs such as 
an escalating carbon tax are proposed to motivate the implementation of energy 
efficiency measures. 246 Research and development programs will be put in place to 
develop and demonstrate new technologies. 247  The longer-term effects of such 
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programs will be included in future electricity planning.248 Current energy efficiency 
initiatives will be scaled up and become mandatory. 249  Energy efficiency 
standards,250 guidelines and codes of practice should be developed and awareness 
training carried out widely within industrial sector. 251 Industrial sources responsible 
for more than 0.1 per cent of the total sector emissions will be required to prepare 
and implement approved mitigation plans.252 These may include energy efficiency 
and energy management measures. 
 
The emerging policy objectives on climate change are further mirrored in 
draft sustainable development policy. The Draft National Strategy on Sustainable 
Development and Action Plan 2010-2014 (Draft Sustainable Development 
Strategy)253 sets out the strategy and action plan to achieve the vision of a sustainable 
society.254 The Strategy comprises three elements. Firstly, economic development 
must be redirected towards a more sustainable path.255 One of the key objectives is to 
reduce the use and emission intensity of resources. 256 Energy efficiency measures, 
especially where these result in decreased fossil fuel consumption are of relevance. 
Secondly, behaviour change is required to promote environmentally responsible 
behaviour (among other goals). 257 The Strategy supports the use of MBIs to drive 
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behaviour change in various focus areas, including increased energy efficiency.258 
The third element to the strategy is the incorporation of sustainability issues into 
policies and planning of all relevant sectors and levels within government.259 
 
The Draft Sustainable Development Strategy Action Plan identifies five 
strategic priorities of which two, ‘responding to climate change‘, and ‘towards a 
green economy’ have particular relevance to energy efficiency.260 The energy and 
industrial sectors are targeted to reduce resource use and energy intensity. The 
energy efficiency targets for overall consumption and for industry and mining are 
incorporated.261 Once again, planned interventions rely heavily on MBIs such as an 
escalating carbon tax to achieve this.262 The goals will be aligned with the national 
climate change response strategy when finalised.263 
 
The review of relevant environmental policies above highlights that energy 
efficiency measures are central to emerging climate change response and sustainable 
development strategies. It is, therefore, crucial that the importance of energy 
efficiency is reflected in South African energy policy. 
 
4.2. Energy Policies 
 
In 1998, the erstwhile Department of Minerals and Energy released the White 
Paper on the Energy Policy of the Republic of South Africa (Energy White Paper)264 
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which outlines the main challenges facing the energy sector in the post-apartheid era. 
It identifies five key objectives which need to be addressed in South Africa’s energy 
sector: 265  ‘increasing access to affordable energy services’; ‘improving energy 
governance’; 266  ‘stimulating economic development‘; ‘managing energy related 
environmental impacts’ and ‘securing supply through diversity’. 267  
 
The Energy White Paper extends the historical focus on energy production 
alone to a more sustainable approach that includes considerations of social, health 
and environmental impacts, including the need to reduce greenhouse gases. As such 
it ‘holds considerable promise in laying the policy basis for a sector well equipped to 
respond to the challenges of climate change mitigation.’ 268  Many of the goals 
outlined in the environmental policies described in chapter 4.1 already featured in the 
Energy White Paper.269 
 
Energy efficiency is identified as a significant tool to provide both financial 
and environmental benefits.270 The importance of energy pricing is identified and the 
need to implement energy efficiency measures and technological advancements271 
which provide a balance between supporting economic growth while internalising 
social and environmental costs.272 Recognising that previous governments had done 
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little to promote energy efficiency, the policy advocates a commitment from 
government ‘to facilitate greater energy efficiency’,273 particularly within industry 
and the transport sector. Part of this effort entails the development on national energy 
efficiency targets 274  and the necessary institutional capacity to promote energy 
efficiency programmes.275  
 
The Energy White Paper includes discussion on fiscal and pricing issues and 
the usefulness of fiscal mechanisms for achieving energy policy objectives.  It 
advocated that the government investigate further the opportunity to implement 
MBIs such as income tax options, subsidies, removal of perverse subsidies,276  fuel 
and energy levies to promote energy efficiency and environmental goals. 277 
However, a carbon tax was viewed at the time as being a threat to the developing 
economy.278 
 
Some of the goals and initiatives put forward in the Energy White Paper have 
been the subject of further policy development in the ensuing years, particularly in 
relation to renewable energy, electricity pricing and energy efficiency.  
 
The White Paper on the Renewable Energy Policy of the Republic of South 
Africa 279 (Renewable Energy Policy) was published in 2003. It promotes the 
development of the renewable energy industry in South Africa and sets a ten-year 
target   for renewable energy to contribute 10 000 GWh to total energy consumption 
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by 2013.280 The Renewable Energy Policy advocates the use of renewable energy 
sources, mainly biomass, wind, solar and small-scale hydroelectric schemes for 
power generation and non-electric technologies such as solar water heating and bio-
fuels.’281 
 
MBIs are seen as fundamental to the development of the renewable energy 
sector and the success of the initiative.282 The initial high costs to commercialise new 
technologies make renewable energy options uncompetitive in the short to medium 
term. Government support in terms of subsidies, levies, tax rebates and other 
measures will be necessary to overcome this barrier to renewable energy entry into 
the energy market. 283  
 
While the Renewable Energy Policy deals primarily with the development of 
a renewable energy industry, there is some overlap between renewable energy and 
the promotion of energy efficiency.284  The policy highlights the potential to use 
renewable energy sources to provide energy close to the point of consumption to 
reduce transmission losses. This provides an energy efficient means of decreasing 
demand-side consumption, especially relevant in industrial, commercial and 
household applications. 285  Widespread installation of solar energy equipment in 
industry and commercial buildings result in decreased demand and therefore forestall 
predicted investment in new power plants. 286 As stated in context of the other related 
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policy documents, legislation will be passed to promote renewable energy and 
energy efficiency opportunities.287  
 
Building on the Energy White Paper theme regarding the importance of 
electricity pricing, the then Department of Minerals and Energy (DME) developed 
the Electricity Pricing Policy (EPP)288  in 2008. The policy aims to balance the 
competing objectives of supplying affordable electricity to low income users while at 
the same time ensuring that electricity prices are ‘cost reflective’ overall. The EPP 
advocates that electricity prices provide a realistic market signal, reflective of supply 
costs, to generate sufficient revenue to ensure the financial viability of the electricity 
sector.289  
 
In theory, a competitive electricity market would result in the most efficient 
prices. As described in chapter 2, environmental and social costs are not always 
adequately incorporated. The South African electricity supply industry is tightly 
regulated and dominated by Eskom. Nonetheless, it is very important to set 
electricity prices at a level that ensures that the allocation of resources and 
consumption of electricity (and other energy carriers) is as efficient as possible and 
that the industry remains financially viable.290  
 
There are a number of principles put forward in the EPP that are particularly 
important in relation to promoting energy efficiency. The EPP maintains that 
electricity prices should allow the electricity industry to generate sufficient revenue 
to cover the costs incurred with a reasonable profit and to obtain reasonable funding 
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for future investment.291 As far as possible, tariffs should accurately reflect the costs 
incurred in providing electricity.292  Taxes and levies may be imposed ‘over and 
above the cost reflective charges’293 for purposes such as promoting environmental 
improvements. In this regard, transparency is paramount. The EPP recommends that 
electricity billing is ‘unbundled’ so that customers are provided with sufficient 
information about their consumption and costs to enable them to make informed 
decisions.294  
 
Another element of the EPP that should promote energy efficiency in 
industry is the policy position that long-term forecasts should be issued by the 
national Energy Regulator of South Africa (NERSA) on an annual basis. This should 
provide industry with a greater level of certainty with regards to pay back on medium 
to long-term energy efficiency initiatives and investment opportunities.295 While the 
EPP generally opposes the concept of cross subsidies and promotes the 
discontinuation of many of those currently occurring within the energy supply 
industry, it is recognised that some cross subsidies may be necessary to achieve 
specific social, political and economic objectives.296 The policy framework however 
suggests that the terms and objectives of cross subsidies must be transparent and 
communicated to the public.297  
 
Demand-side management (DSM) forms a key aspect of the EPP.298This is 
particularly pertinent to industrial energy efficiency in that it advocates an approach 
that allows a licensee to recover costs for the promotion of DSM and energy 
efficiency improvements. NERSA would decide the amount of the funding based on 
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application and will ensure that it is fairly administered. 299 NERSA is tasked with 
implementing the EPP and providing the regulatory oversight to ensure that tariffs 
and prices are equitable and reasonable.300 
 
The National Energy Efficiency Strategy for the Republic of South Africa301 
(Energy Efficiency Strategy) was developed to further the energy efficiency 
interventions proposed in the Energy White Paper. The Energy Efficiency Strategy 
was first developed in 2005, but was reviewed in 2008 to incorporate the energy 
efficiency targets agreed to with several prominent industries under DME’s 
voluntary Energy Efficiency Accord.302 The Energy Efficiency Strategy is aimed at 
encouraging ‘sustainable energy sector development and energy use through efficient 
practices’ 303  that minimise undesirable environmental and health impacts and 
contribute to ‘secure and affordable energy for all’. 304  The Energy Efficiency 
Strategy translates this vision into eight goals covering aspects of social, 
environmental and economic sustainability305 and sets an overall target to reduce 
final energy demand by 12 per cent by 2015.306 This is devolved into the following 
specific targets for individual sectors: industry and mining: 15 per cent; power 
generation: 15 per cent; commercial and public buildings: 20 per cent; transport: 9 
per cent, and residential: 10 per cent. For the industry sector, annual sub-sector 
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302 Department of Minerals and Energy Energy Efficiency Accord (August 2006) (updated). This is a 
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targets to improve energy intensity are incorporated.307  The target for the power 
generation industry is applicable to ‘non-essential consumption’ only. This equates 
to the implementation of similar measures envisaged for the general industry sector. 
Core power generation is exempted from the target because energy efficiency 
improvements in this regard generally require significant capital investment to 
refurbish or replace equipment. The Energy Efficiency Strategy tasks Eskom with 
developing long-term plans to address this.308  
 
These targets are currently not mandatory. A range of command-and-control 
regulatory methods are put forward to support the Strategy including the 
development of efficiency standards, appliance labelling, certification and 
accreditation, awareness education, research and development and energy audits and 
management systems.309 However, mechanisms such as these can only achieve so 
much if voluntarily applied. The Energy Efficiency Strategy also advocates the 
implementation of energy efficiency initiatives under the mandate provided by 
legislation such as the National Energy Act310 and Electricity Act.311 It is anticipated 
that amendments and regulations will be published as required. It is likely that 
certain elements like efficiency standards and energy audits may be made mandatory 
under suitable regulations. 312 
 
MBIs provide a further set of implementing instruments under the Energy 
Efficiency Strategy. Most of the interventions identified as part of the Strategy have a 
short pay-back period313  with current and expected energy prices. Investment or 
expenditure by industry, companies or individuals is therefore expected to be 
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309 Energy Efficiency Strategy (2008) at 28-31. 
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justifiable in pure economic terms. For those interventions with a longer pay-back 
period, other options are available or may be implemented through the fiscal reform 
process. These include the existing Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) 
processes and incentives, rebates and subsidies some of which have been 
implemented and are discussed in chapter 5.314 The sectoral programme for industry 
and mining stresses the use of energy service companies (ESCOs) and the CDM to 
maximise potential savings from energy efficiency initiatives.315 
 
4.3. Fiscal Policies 
 
The National Treasury recognizes the potential of MBIs as a tool to address 
certain environmental concerns. In April 2006 the Tax Policy Chief Directorate 
produced the Draft Policy Paper: A Framework for Considering Market–Based 
Instruments to Support Environmental Fiscal Reform in South Africa (Draft MBI 
Policy) 316 that explores how environmentally-related taxes and charges could be 
used to drive environmental goals317 in a cost effective manner and the potential 
contribution of such taxes to revenue generation. One of the environmental priorities 
discussed in this context is the role of energy efficiency in addressing air pollution 
and climate change.318 The Treasury focuses on revenue generating instruments such 
as taxes and charges as opposed to expenditure instruments like subsidies. The Draft 
MBI Policy describes the framework and criteria used by the Treasury to evaluate the 
suitability of MBIs for use in South Africa. Existing environmental taxes and levies 
are reviewed against accepted principles of good taxation such as efficiency, equity, 
certainty, simplicity and cost minimization as well as a set of criteria developed to 
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specifically evaluate environmentally related tax proposal. 319  These are: 
environmental effectiveness; tax revenue; support for the tax; legislative aspects; 
technical and administrative issues; competitiveness effects; distributional impacts; 
and adjoining policy areas.320 
 
Options for environmental tax reform measures are discussed in terms of 
reforming existing environmentally–related taxes and non-environmentally related 
taxes with perverse environmental incentives and introducing new taxes or fiscal 
measures to promote environmental goals.321 A clear message enunciated throughout 
the Draft MBI Policy is that ‘earmarking‘ environmental tax revenue is not in line 
with sound fiscal management practices and should be considered carefully on a 
case- by-case basis.322  
 
The Treasury is in the process of assessing the possible introduction of a 
carbon pricing mechanism in the form of a carbon tax or an emissions trading 
scheme (ETS). A discussion paper entitled Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions: the 
Carbon Tax Option (Carbon Tax Discussion Paper) was released in 2010.323  It 
outlines some possible options for carbon taxation in South Africa and provides 
some discussion on the implications and design considerations of carbon taxation to 
stimulate comment from stakeholders. Similarly a document on a carbon ETS will be 
prepared to complete the assessment.324 Currently the Treasury favours a carbon tax 
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as more suitable for South Africa.325 The carbon tax options outlined in the Carbon 
Tax Discussion Paper will be discussed in more detail in chapter 6.  
 
In summary, emerging policy for sustainable development, climate change 
and energy is consolidating into a coherent direction with regards to the transition to 
a low carbon energy sector through the promotion of renewable energy sources and 
energy efficiency. South African policy makers clearly favour the use of MBIs to 
achieve these goals, both generally and in the specific context of improved energy 
efficiency. The Treasury, in particular, has been clearly proactive in terms of 
environment-related fiscal reform. In this regard, the Treasury ‘appears to be rapidly 
‘greening’ itself.’326Institutions and legislation are being put in place to provide ‘the 
‘requisite hooks’ on which to pin these economic instruments‘.327 In the following 
chapter, discussion turns to a critical consideration of relevant MBIs and enabling 
legislation currently operating in South Africa to promote energy efficiency 
particularly within industry. 
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5. An Evaluation of Market-Based Instruments Currently 
Implemented in South Africa to Promote Energy Efficiency in 
Industry 
 
The comprehensive policy framework described in chapter 4 forms the basis 
for a number of market-based instruments (MBIs) introduced in South Africa in the 
past few years which seek to promote energy efficiency in industry. Of these, the 
major instruments that use current markets are described and assessed in this 
chapter.328 These are: the S12I investment allowance for industrial policy projects;329 
the energy efficiency allowance;330  and a number of MBIs that impact on the price 
of electricity. The latter include: the electricity levy; 331 the renewable energy feed-in 
tariff (REFIT)332 and cogeneration feed-in tariff (COFIT); 333 and the demand side 
management programme.334 The dissertation now turns to an analysis of these MBIs. 
Each instrument will be described and then evaluated according to the relevant 
criteria highlighted in the Draft Policy Paper: A Framework for Considering 
Market–Based Instruments to Support Environmental Fiscal Reform in South Africa 
(Draft MBI Policy) 335  and discussed in chapter 3.3. These are environmental 
effectiveness, certainty, technical and administrative aspects, tax revenue, support for 
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the tax, legislative aspects, competitiveness, distributional impacts and adjoining 
policy areas.336 
 
5.1.  Energy Efficiency Investment Allowance for Industrial Policy Projects 
 
5.1.1. An Overview of the Energy Efficiency Investment Allowance  
 
Investment in energy efficient technology is supported by ‘the additional 
investment and training allowances in respect of industrial policy projects’ inserted 
as s12I into the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 (S12I Allowances) in 2008. 337 These 
provisions allow for tax rebates on manufacturing sector investments described as 
‘industrial policy projects’ that promote skills development 338  (S12I Training 
Allowance) and energy efficiency through the use of new technology 339  (S12I 
Investment Allowance).  While these are the primary aims, several other industrial 
policy objectives must be met for a project to qualify as an ‘industrial policy project’. 
These are ‘innovative processes’, the use of clean production technology for 
improved energy efficiency, general business linkages, procurement from small, 
medium and micro enterprises, direct employment creation and skills 
development.340 The qualification process is subject to the approval of the Minister 
of Trade and Industry based on recommendations made by an adjudication 
committee.341  This committee is comprised of representatives from the departments 
of Trade and Industry and the National Treasury or the South African Revenue 
Services (SARS).342 
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The S12I Allowances apply to qualifying industrial policy projects that 
exceed R30m for upgrading existing facilities, described as ‘brownfield’ projects, 
and R200m for new or ‘greenfield’ industrial projects. 343  The allowance is 
potentially 55 per cent of the cost of the manufacturing asset if assigned ‘preferred 
status’ or 35 per cent in any other case, up to maximum specified amounts.344 This 
equates to a potentially lucrative incentive with maximum savings of R900m for 
greenfields projects or R550m for upgrades on existing facilities. 345 Some 
manufacturing industries are excluded, such as arms manufacture346 and projects that 
receive concurrent industrial incentives from any national sphere of government or 
constitute an industrial participation project.347  
 
The National Treasury published Regulations made under Section 12I of the 
Income Tax Act, 1962 (Act No.58 of 1962) (12I Regulations) 348 to provide clarity 
and substance as to what constitutes an ‘industrial policy project’. The 12I 
Regulations include a complicated point system that assigns a weighting to the 
factors that determine whether a project qualifies in this regard.349  
 
To qualify as an industrial policy project, a project must first satisfy a number 
of prerequisite conditions with respect to skills development and energy efficiency 
improvement. A project must spend at least two per cent of the annual wage bill on 
industrial skills development and achieve an energy efficiency improvement of at 
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1962) in GNR 639 GG 33385 of 23 July 2010. 




least ten per cent over the allowance period.350 For new projects, ‘modern, viable 
energy-efficient equipment and processes’ in comparison to industry sector must be 
used.351  
 
Thereafter, points are assigned for the ‘industrial policy project’ elements that 
are described in S12I (8).352 Projects must achieve at least five out of ten points to 
qualify for the 35 per cent additional allowance and eight out of ten points to attain 
the ‘preferred status’ that allows for a rebate of 55 per cent of the asset costs.353 
 
Some guidance and definition is provided around the industrial policy 
elements that must be considered by the adjudication committee although some 
aspects still remain vague or inconsistent. The lack of clarity relates particularly to 
three elements, namely, innovative processes; energy efficiency through cleaner 
production; and business linkages.  
 
 ‘Innovative processes’354 refer to the use of new processes that ‘materially 
improve production time, reduce production costs, improve product quality or 
improve product longevity’.355 The definition of innovative processes is given as 
‘changing pre-existing techniques and the use of plant, machinery or equipment’356 
In the case of greenfield projects, this clearly cannot apply to actual equipment or 
processes so it must infer a comparison with similar processes in the pre-existing 
industry sector. There is no guidance on how this should be assessed or what 
benchmarking processes should be used.  
 
                                                     
350 As measured against a baseline established over the year preceding the application. 
351 12I Regulations (2010) reg 2.  
352  Income Tax Act s12I(8).  
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'Improved energy efficiency through cleaner production’ 357 is one of the 
primary goals of this MBI. Over and above the prerequisite of a ten per cent energy 
efficiency improvement, additional points may be allocated above higher 
thresholds.358 For brownfield projects points are allocated where the manufacturing 
asset achieves an energy efficiency improvement relative to the baseline energy 
consumption. The baseline is measured prior to the installation of the technology.359 
For a greenfield project, there is no baseline energy consumption for comparison. 
Therefore, the 12I Regulations allow for an allocation of points at the discretion of 
the Minister of Trade and Industry if the project meets the following description: 
 
’(T)he project will utilise modern, viable energy-efficient equipment and 
processes throughout the additional investment allowance benefit period 360 
innovative for the particular industrial sector, as certified by South African National 
Energy Development Institute’361.  
 
There is no guidance regarding the determination of what ‘modern, viable 
energy efficient equipment’ is or how ‘innovative’ is benchmarked for the particular 
industrial sector. It is interesting that the South African National Energy 
Development Institute (SANEDI) will assess this while the adjudication committee 
rules on how innovative the process is. These may be closely linked given that the 
aim of the project is improved energy efficiency. 
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‘General business linkages’362 concerns the extent to which the project will 
support the competitiveness of the local production of goods. This criterion is 
applied similarly to greenfield and brownfield projects. One point is available for 
projects that manufacture goods where less than 40 per cent of the South Africa 
market is produced locally 363  and to projects where local production requires 
‘significant investment’. 364 It is unclear what constitutes ‘significant investment’ and 
how the adjudication committee assesses the matter. 
 
5.1.2. Critical Analysis of the Energy Efficiency Investment Allowance  
 
In terms of environmental effectiveness, the additional investment allowance 
promotes energy efficiency in both existing and new industry. The scope for 
improved energy efficiency in industry and the potential environmental benefits have 
been discussed in chapter 2 and 4. There is a direct demonstrable link between 
improved energy efficiency in industry and better air quality and conservation of 
natural resources. However, energy efficiency is not the only driver behind the S12I 
Allowances.365 Only those projects that satisfy several other criteria are eligible for 
the allowances as ‘industrial policy projects’. The S12I Investment Allowance is 
therefore not driven solely by environmental outcomes. 
 
In this sense, there is a trade-off between ‘environmental effectiveness’ and 
‘adjoining policy areas’. Many of the factors incorporated in the 12I Regulations 
point system could be classified as objectives of adjoining policy areas such as skills 
development, job creation, support for small, medium and micro enterprises and the 
creation of industrial development zones. However, some potential energy efficiency 
investment projects may not qualify under the point system and the potential 
                                                     
362 S12I(8)(b) and 12I Regulations (2010) regs 5.3 and 6.3. 
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environmental benefit is then foregone if the project is not justifiable without the S12 
Investment Allowance. 
 
The impact on competitiveness is an interesting consideration. Support for 
‘industry policy projects’ is specifically aimed at increasing the competitiveness of 
industries or projects that incorporate certain desired behaviour. The S12I Investment 
Allowances are offered to projects that upgrade industry through job creation, skills 
development, energy efficiency improvement, increased local production of scarce 
goods and various other factors described above. Industries that do not fulfil the 
criteria are therefore at a competitive disadvantage. The S12I Investment Allowance 
appears to favour new entrants to the industry, or at least new facilities, in that the 
maximum allowance for greenfield projects is R900m in contrast to R550m for the 
expansion of existing projects.366   
 
Distributional or equity considerations are similar to those discussed in terms 
of competitiveness. Originally, the Treasury proposed a 15 per cent deductible 
allowance on investment in energy efficiency equipment provided energy efficiency 
reductions were certified by the Energy Efficiency Agency.367 The S12I Allowances 
offer a higher incentive, but only to those projects that fulfil a range of policy 
objectives. The 15 per cent proposal would have allowed for a more equitable 
application across industry, but it would not have the promoted the additional desired 
behaviours.  
 
In terms of legislative aspects, S12I makes it mandatory for the Minister of 
Trade and Industry to publish regulations prescribing the factors that must be 
considered to qualify a project for the S12I Allowances.368 In this regard the point 
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system has been developed and published as the S12I Regulations. In light of the 
large potential benefits accruing from the tax allowance, these regulations are 
important in providing transparency to the decision making process. The requirement 
that an independent body369 certifies energy efficiency improvement claims further 
supports transparency. 370  It could be argued, however, that some aspects of the 
regulations lack clarity and may allow for subjective decision making on the part of 
the adjudication committee and Minister of Trade and Industry. Some examples are 
discussed above, such as the determination of what ‘modern, viable energy efficient 
equipment’ 371  is or how it is determined to be ‘innovative’ for the particular 
industrial sector.372  
 
 One of the main drawbacks of S12I Investment Allowance is the lack of 
simplicity and the impact this has in terms of certainty. This encompasses both 
technical design and administrative aspects. Regarding technical aspects, application 
of the allowance depends on the consideration of many factors. The points system 
described in the regulations seems unnecessarily complicated and depends on some 
apparently subjective factors as described above. It would appear that projects 
proponents planning to apply for approval as potential ‘industrial policy projects’ 
cannot be certain that the application will be successful.  
 
The administrative requirements are also fairly complex. A new inter-
departmental committee is set up for the administration of this allowance. The 
adjudication committee comprises at least three members each from the National 
Treasury and the department of Trade and Industry.373 These committee members 
should be sufficiently capacitated with the technical skills required to evaluate 
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applications and make recommendations to the Minister. Given the lack of technical 
capacity within many government departments,374 this issue may impact negatively 
on the success of the initiative. In addition, the approval process may be time 
consuming and subject to delays as interdepartmental committee meetings are 
sometimes difficult to schedule and the minister is required to make the final 
approval. 
 
 It may be premature to assess how much support there is for this incentive. 
The 12I Regulations were only published in July 2010 and so it remains to be seen to 
what extent applications are submitted and approvals granted. Early indications are 
positive as five applications have been approved to date.375 The potentially lucrative 
benefits available under the allowance provide a significant incentive to industry.  
 
The S12I Investment Allowance is a positive incentive and as such does not 
generate revenue. Given the potential benefits of improved energy efficiency, such as 
avoided costs of new power generation investment, the overall effect on the economy 
is likely to be positive.  
 
5.2. Energy Efficiency Savings Allowance 
 
5.2.1. An Overview of the Energy Efficiency Savings Allowance 
 
For companies who make energy efficiency improvements though investment 
in new equipment or through other interventions, potential energy savings may be 
partly eroded by increased tax liability on higher profit margins.376 To offset this 
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anomalous situation, S12L of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962377 makes provision for 
a tax allowance for energy efficiency savings (Energy Efficiency Savings 
Allowance). The allowance may be deducted from the taxable income of any person 
derived ‘from carrying on any trade’.378  
 
The allowance is calculated as the energy efficiency savings379 multiplied by 
the lowest feed-in-tariff 380 and divided by a factor of two.381 The energy efficiency 
savings calculations must be carried out and certified by acceptable institutions or 
bodies using specific criteria and methodology.382 The outcome of the certification 
process is an energy efficiency savings certificate that documents the baseline energy 
consumption, 383  the ‘reporting period energy use’ 384  and the annual energy 
efficiency savings determined by these as well as the methodology used for the 
calculations.385 
 
According to S12L (1), regulations will be issued by the Minister of 
Energy386 to specify the criteria and methodology as well as accredited institutions or 
bodies. These regulations do not appear to be available as yet, but some guidance 
may be obtained from the draft explanatory memorandum that was published with 
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the Draft Taxation Laws Amendment Bill.387 According to this document, accredited 
‘measurement and verification’ professionals will undertake the calculations and 
SANEDI will act as the certification authority. The International Performance 
Measurement and Verification Protocol388 of the Efficiency Valuation Organisation 
will form the basis of the regulations with regards to methodology.389 In line with 
this, the South African Bureau of Standards (SABS) has developed a technical 
specification, Measurement and Verification of Energy Savings (SATS 50010)390 for 
use in voluntary or regulatory processes where energy savings calculations are 
required.391 SATS 50010 calculates energy savings as the difference between the 
reporting period energy use and the baseline energy use adjusted for various factors. 
The adjustment caters for the fact that conditions may change over the assessment 
period and a straight subtraction of energy use at end of the period from that at the 
beginning may misrepresent energy efficiency gains.392 For example, if energy use 
drops over the course of a year due to turndown in production, the reduction in 
energy consumption cannot be claimed as an improvement in energy efficiency. 
Once production increases, energy consumption will return to normal levels. 
 
The Energy Efficiency Savings Allowance has yet to come into force although 
the tax amendments indicated that the allowance would operate between 1 January 
2010393 and 1 January 2020.394 
                                                     
387 National Treasury Draft Explanatory Memorandum on the Taxation Laws Amendment Bill 2009. 
Available at 
http://www.treasury.gov.za/public%20comments/EM%20for%20TLAB%202009.pdfwww.treasury.g
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390 SABS Measurement and Verification of Energy Savings (SATS 50010:2010) SABS Standards 
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5.2.2. Critical Analysis of the Energy Efficiency Savings Allowance 
 
The Energy Efficiency Savings Allowance acts as a positive incentive, or at 
least prevents a perverse incentive, in supporting energy efficiency improvements in 
industry.395 Energy efficiency projects would typically be motivated by the avoided 
energy cost using economic indicators such as payback period. Once the energy 
savings related to the energy efficiency investment or process improvements have 
been realised, taxable profits will increase. Energy efficiency improvements would 
therefore result in increased revenue for the Treasury. The Energy Efficiency Savings 
Allowance is aimed to removing this hurdle, allowing the taxpayer to accrue the full 
benefit of the energy savings.396  
 
The Energy Efficiency Savings Allowance is well designed in several 
respects. It is fairly simple and available to all who can demonstrate energy 
efficiency savings related to carrying out a trade. There is no complicated point 
system or additional criteria that must be satisfied in order for the project to qualify. 
The only requirement is that energy saving must be demonstrated using acceptable 
methodology and must be certified by SANEDI. As discussed above, regulations will 
be published to clarify this process. Although some uncertainty is created by the fact 
that the allowance has been published before the regulations, some guidance is 
provided by SATS 50010. Project proponents can estimate potential payback with fair 
certainty in as far as energy savings and feed-in-tariffs can be forecast.397 The ten-
year period during which the allowance will be available has been published and is 
long enough for planned projects to take advantage of the incentive.  
 
The Energy Efficiency Savings Allowance is flexible as there is no minimum 
or maximum allowance. The amount is purely dependent on the energy savings 
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realised. In addition, the Treasury does not need to allocate funds to cover the 
allowance as the energy saving raises the revenue in itself. From an equity 
standpoint, all industrial energy efficiency projects are eligible but it stands to reason 
that it can only apply to existing projects. 
 
The Energy Efficiency Savings Allowance is administered through the 
existing tax system by SARS.398 This government department is widely considered to 
be efficient and effective.399 The requirement that independent bodies calculate and 
certify the energy savings will ensure that administration of the incentive is 
transparent and credible. The certification process may, however, prove costly and 
time-consuming which may present a barrier from the perspective of the taxpayer 
attempting to claim the allowance. 
 
One area of potential misalignment is that of the relative pricing of energy 
carriers. The Income Tax Act does not define energy or energy efficiency. SATS 
50010 describes energy efficiency as the ‘efficient utilisation of an energy carrier or 
resource’.400 If this definition holds for the allowance, then an industry could claim 
the allowance for improved usage of electricity, fuel oil, coal or gas to name a few 
energy carriers. The actual savings in monetary terms would be the energy reduction 
(or ‘energy savings’ in 12L terms) multiplied by the cost of that carrier. The 
allowance is calculated using the lowest feed-in-tariff which is linked to electricity 
prices. As different factors may influence the pricing of petroleum industry energy 
carriers such as fuel oil relative to electricity or coal, there may be unintended 
consequences. The allowance calculated may be considerably larger or less than the 
actual monetary savings. 
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5.3. Electricity Pricing Reform 
 
As discussed in chapter 2 and 3, energy pricing is crucial in promoting 
energy-efficient consumption patterns. In theory, the cost of energy sends a price 
signal to the market and allows for the most efficient allocation of resources. 
Realistic energy pricing is fundamental to internalising the social and environmental 
costs of production and providing a clear signal to consumers to reduce consumption. 
Coal, electricity and to a lesser extent, fuel oil provide most of the energy consumed 
in industry.401  Therefore, MBIs that affect the pricing of these commodities will 
have a greater impact on energy efficiency in industry. Coal and fuel oil prices are 
not regulated in South Africa but are determined by the market.402 There are no 
MBIs currently in place to intervene in this regard although the carbon tax under 
discussion may affect coal and fuel oil pricing depending on the design of the tax.403  
 
However, as discussed in previous chapters,404 the price of electricity has 
been low by world standards historically and has resulted in an energy inefficient 
industrial growth pathway that is viewed as a market failure.405 In this respect, there 
have been significant changes in electricity pricing governance in recent years and 
NERSA has approved some dramatic electricity price hikes since 2008 to finance 
Eskom’s expansion plans and overcome challenges to meet current electricity 
supply. These increases incorporate the costs associated with a number of MBIs 
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aimed at improving energy efficiency and supporting the growth of the renewable 
energy sector. The regulatory framework governing electricity price and tariff setting 
is discussed further below as well as those MBIs that are currently in place or under 
discussion for incorporation in electricity pricing. These are the renewable energy 
feed-in tariff (REFIT), the cogeneration feed-in tariff (COFIT), demand-side 
management (DSM) and the electricity levy.  
 
5.3.1. Electricity Pricing Regulatory Framework 
 
In terms of the Electricity Regulation Act406  (ERA), the National Energy 
Regulator of South Africa (NERSA) is tasked with regulating electricity prices and 
tariffs 407  and promoting energy efficiency 408  amongst other duties. This is 
accomplished through the licensing of the electricity industry409 and the approval of 
prices, charges and tariffs that licensees charge customers. 410  As Eskom is the 
majority electricity provider, prices approved for Eskom influence overall pricing.411 
Municipality tariffs are largely set in line with Eskom’s approved tariff increases412 
although there is a complex set of laws that govern the setting of tariffs at the 
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distribution level.413 Prices and tariffs are set in line with the principles414 that form 
the cornerstone of the Electricity Pricing Policy (EPP)415 described in Chapter 4.2. 
In the past two years, NERSA has approved Eskom’s interim price increase of 31.3 
per cent on the average standard electricity price416 for the period 2009 to 2010 and 
an average increase of about 25.8 per cent increase per year for their Multi-year 
Price Determination for 2010 to 2013 417(MYPD2). The tariff determination is based 
on calculation of the allowed revenue that accounts for all the costs associated with 
generating electricity. 418  In order to make tariffs ‘cost reflective’ Eskom’s 
expenditure in respect of the cost of finance for the generation capacity expansion 
programme419  and government incentives such as REFIT420  and COFIT must be 
included over and above energy and operating costs.421 The electricity levy is also 
included in the overall determination.422 In addition, ERA makes provision for the 
inclusion of incentives that drive improved ‘technical or economic efficiency’.423 In 
this respect, Eskom’s cost determination includes funding for their demand-side 
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417 NERSA Reasons for Decision: Revenue Application – Multi-Year Price Determination 2010/11 to 
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management (DSM) programme.424 Thus the electricity generator is able to recover 
costs associated with the government’s renewable energy and energy efficiency 
MBIs by passing through costs to consumers via the electricity price. Higher 
electricity prices mean that consumers, including industry, will be encouraged to 
become more energy efficient. These MBIs will be discussed in more detail below. 
 
5.4. Renewable Energy Feed-In Tariff 
 
5.4.1. An Overview of Renewable Energy Feed-In Tariff 
 
NERSA has developed renewable energy feed-in tariffs (REFIT) to 
incentivise the production and supply of energy to the national grid from various 
renewable technologies. In March 2009, NERSA published the South African 
Renewable Energy Feed-In Tariff Regulatory Guidelines 425  (REFIT Guidelines) 
under the mandate provided by the ERA. The REFIT Guidelines set out the 
institutional framework, key roles and responsibilities of participants and tariff 
conditions.426 In essence, the REFITs provide guaranteed prices for a certain period 
of time to generators of electricity from renewable energy technologies.427  It is 
anticipated that most renewable energy generators will be new entrants to the 
domestic energy market and are generally described as independent power producers 
(IPPs).  
 
In line with the EPP, these prices are based on cost recovery plus a 
reasonable profit on the part of the IPP. NERSA included four renewable energy 
technologies in the first phase of REFIT (referred to as REFIT I). The tariffs were set 
at: landfill gas power plants (0.896 R per kWh); for hydropower plants of less than 
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10 MW (0.940 R per kWh); wind power (1.247 R per kWh); and for concentrated 
solar power (CSP) plants (2.092 R per kWh).428  
 
The REFIT Guidelines also appointed Eskom as the Renewable Energy 
Purchasing Agency (REPA).429 This codifies the cabinet decision in September 2007 
to make Eskom the single buyer from IPPs.430 The REPA is obliged to purchase 
electricity at the set REFIT from those IPPs who have been successfully licensed by 
NERSA.431 In terms of the REFIT guidelines the cost incurred by the REPA namely 
Eskom, may be ‘passed through’ to electricity end users as with any other costs used 
to determine cost-reflective prices.432  
 
After comment was received from stakeholders, the REFIT were revised and 
expanded to cover nine technology categories overall in October 2009.433 Additional 
technologies and their respective tariffs include: biomass solid (1.18 R per kWh); 
biogas (0.96 R per kWh); grid-connected Photovoltaic systems larger than one MW 
(3.94 R per kWh); and two variations of CSP, ‘trough without storage’ (3.14 R per 
kWh) and ‘Tower’ (2.31R per kWh). Despite the two phases of REFIT published to 
date, the programme has still not commenced due to some institutional issues.434  
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Even before the REFIT programme has been implemented, a further review 
of the scheme has been undertaken 435   in order to align with the Electricity 
Regulations on New Generation Capacity 436  gazetted in November 2010. The 
revised tariffs set out in the 2011 NERSA Consultation Paper Review of Renewable 
Energy Feed-In Tariffs (REFIT Review 2011)437 are considerably lower than those 
published in 2009438 due to changes over this period in the financial parameters used 
to calculate tariffs. The cost of capital component has dropped significantly due to 
decreased nominal cost of debt and inflation rate.439 It is unclear how the reduced 
REFIT tariffs proposed would impact on the MYPD2 electricity price increases 
already approved for 2010 to 2013. It would appear that Eskom revenue could 
exceed that which is required to cover their REFIT commitments if MYPD2 tariffs 
are not adjusted accordingly.  
 
5.4.2. Critical Analysis of Renewable Energy Feed-In Tariff 
 
The REFIT is both a positive and negative incentive in the sense that it 
provides support to renewable energy generators entering the electricity market, 
while simultaneously promoting energy efficiency through the disincentive of 
increased electricity prices. The major concern with the programme is that although 
the REFIT tariffs have contributed to electricity price increases approved for 2011 to 
2013, agreements with IPPs are not yet in place. 
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5.5. Cogeneration Feed-In Tariff 
 
5.5.1. An Overview of the Cogeneration Feed-In Tariff 
 
In a similar programme, NERSA is developing feed-in tariffs that will 
support cogeneration technologies, particularly supporting projects that supply 
electricity to the grid.440 In this regards, a consultation paper entitled Cogeneration 
Regulatory Rules and Feed-In Tariffs (COFIT Regulatory Rules) was published in 
January 2011 to initiate stakeholder comment.441 Cogeneration is defined as ‘the 
simultaneous generation of electricity and useful thermal energy from a common 
fuel/energy source’442 by an industry whose primary purpose is not electricity or 
energy production. The definition also covers the generation of electricity or 
recovery of energy from waste or by-products of the industrial process. 443 
Technologies considered under this scheme are classified into three types. Type one 
includes processes that recover waste heat or energy from waste gases.444 Type two 
covers combined heat and power technologies (CHP)445 using sources that may not 
be renewable.446 Type three focuses on cogeneration processes that generate energy 
from waste that could be classified as a ‘renewable’ energy source such as wood 
chips or bagasse from the pulp and paper industry.447  
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Cogeneration feed-in tariffs (COFIT) are developed to allow a licensed co-
generator to recover the costs of constructing and operating the cogeneration plant in 
line with the EPP.448  
 
5.5.2. Critical Analysis of the Cogeneration Feed-In Tariff 
 
The COFIT programme has particular relevance to energy efficiency in 
industry. By definition, cogeneration processes improve the overall energy efficiency 
of the facility by producing more energy per unit throughput. Investment in projects 
that generate electricity from waste or from waste heat would be recovered through 
the COFIT pricing over the period of the power purchase agreement. If in the future 
the Eskom tariff exceeds the COFIT pricing, the co-generator may decide to use the 
electricity for own use thus avoiding the higher Eskom prices or sell the electricity to 
a third party as an IPP.  
 
As with the REFIT programme, the main concern with COFIT is that 
although the electricity price increases include the costs of implementing COFIT, the 
programme is even further from implementation than REFIT. The draft rules were 
only issued for discussion in January 2011 and if the rate of implementation is as 
slow as the REFIT, the risk remains that revenue accrued to Eskom for COFIT will 
not be spent for that purpose within the period. 
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5.6. Demand-Side Management 
 
5.6.1. An Overview of the Design-Side Management Programme 
 
Eskom’s Demand-Side Management (DSM) programme has been in 
operation since NERSA’s approval of the programme in May 2004.449 It provides a 
positive incentive to electricity users by fully funding projects aimed at peak load 
management and subsidising energy efficiency projects by 50 per cent.450 The DSM 
programme is targeted mainly at commercial and industrial electricity users. The 
programme makes use of the services of energy professionals accredited as energy 
service companies (ESCOs) along the lines advocated in the National Energy 
Efficiency Strategy for the Republic of South Africa 451discussed in Chapter 4.2. 
Companies seeking to take advantage of the programme have to engage an ESCO to 
audit energy use at the facility and submit feasible energy efficiency improvement 
projects to the Eskom DSM for evaluation. Eskom then funds successful projects for 
implementation by the ESCO.452 
 
From an energy industry perspective, the DSM programme aims to harness 
the potential of demand-side energy efficiency and load management in order to 
defer capital expenditure on new power generation facilities. Deferring the new 
power facilities further limits associated electricity price hikes453 and environmental 
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effects.454 Eskom still considers DSM to be the most effective tool to address short-
term electricity shortages.455 
 
Eskom generates revenue to fund the programme through the electricity price 
charged to customers. NERSA approved of R554m over the three-year period of 
2010 to 2013456 which equates to less than a cent per KWh. There is a shortfall of 
R725m over the period compared to Eskom’s application. Eskom is investigating 
alternatives for supplementary funding. 457 
 
5.6.2. Critical Analysis of the Design-Side Management Programme 
 
Eskom’s DSM directly promotes energy efficiency improvements in industry 
by providing subsidised or ‘free retrofits and upgrades’.458 The funding is recovered 
through the electricity price and earmarked for promoting energy efficiency, 
particularly in industry. A level of transparency and fairness is provided by 
NERSA’s oversight of the cost recovery and funding aspect and the role of 
independent ESCOs in identifying feasible projects. However, the selection criteria 
for feasible projects remain the preserve of Eskom and the ESCO and are not widely 
published. Companies that have potential energy efficiency projects must involve an 
ESCO and submit to the Eskom’s potentially lengthy approval process before the 
economic justification for the project can be determined. This makes forward 
planning difficult and has led to a lack of confidence in the programme by 
industry.459  
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Additional measures are contemplated in the power conservation programme 
(PCP).460 The PCP includes a mandatory ‘right to consume’ (RTC) programme for 
large industry which is a trading scheme for energy efficiency. 461 The RTC is an 
MBI that creates a new market in tradable RTC units462 and therefore does not fall 
within the scope of this dissertation. Suffice it to say that mandatory participation by 
large industry is being considered and it is this aspect that diverges from most of the 
MBIs currently available in South Africa to promote energy efficiency in industry. 
 
5.7.  Electricity Levy 
 
5.7.1. An Overview of the Electricity Levy 
 
Another MBI that is ultimately passed on in prices to the electricity user is an 
environmental levy on generators of non-renewable sources of electricity. The 
Electricity Levy, initially two cents per kilowatt-hour, was proposed in 2008 as a 
dual-purpose instrument to promote energy efficiency during the electricity shortages 
and to curb GHG pollution. 463 It came into force on 1 July 2009 and is implemented 
under the Customs and Excise Act 91 of 1964464 and amendments to environmental 
levy items.465 The Electricity Levy was increased to 2.5 cents per kilowatt-hour in 
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April 2011.466 The charge is levied directly on electricity generators of greater than 
five megawatts within South Africa that consume non-renewable fuel. 467  The 
Treasury administers the revenue generated from the Electricity Levy. Renewable 
energy generators and co-generators of electricity, even where fossil fuels are used 
under the COFIT scheme, are exempt.468  
 
5.7.2. Critical Analysis of the Electricity Levy 
 
The generator is allowed to recover the cost of the Electricity Levy through 
the electricity price. Eskom’s average 31.3 per cent interim tariff increase approved 
for the period 2009 to 2010469 included the costs to Eskom of the 2c/KWh.470 In this 
respect, the Electricity Levy promotes energy efficiency through the electricity costs 
in the same way as the other MBIs discussed above. However, it does not drive the 
generators themselves to become more energy efficient or to switch over to 
renewable energy sources, which some would argue to be the main potential benefit 
of this MBI.471 As far as revenue generated for the Treasury, the government did not 
specify to what purpose the estimated R4bn would be allocated.472 The Treasury 
motivated the Electricity Levy increase to provide funding to remedy the damage 
caused to the country’s roads by coal hauling. 473  The Electricity Levy has been 
widely hailed as a first step towards a carbon tax474 or at least that it has a similar 
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effect.475 It is envisaged that the scope of the levy will be broadened to incorporate 
other industries that generate Carbon Dioxide emissions.476  In this regard, some 
carbon tax options are being considered as part of emerging climate change policy 
described in chapter 4.2. These carbon tax options and their possible future use in 
South Africa are discussed in more detail in chapter 6. 3. 
 
5.8. Benefits and Shortcomings of Current MBIs that Promote Energy 
Efficiency in Industry 
 
As described above, several MBIs have been put in place that are either 
aimed directly at promoting energy efficiency in industry or do so indirectly by 
increasing electricity prices. Many of these have been introduced in the past two 
years and it remains to be seen to what extent the available incentives will be taken 
up by industry and whether this will be sufficient to achieve the Energy Efficiency 
Strategy target of 15 per cent.477 However, a brief analysis of the instruments above 
gives rise to some overall conclusions on the potential effectiveness and 
shortcomings of the MBIs implemented in South Africa to date with the objective of 
promoting industrial energy efficiency. 
 
The main barrier to energy efficiency in South Africa’s industry has 
traditionally been the low cost of energy, particularly coal and electricity.478 Great 
strides have been made to address this barrier through efforts to make the electricity 
price reflective of the full cost of supply, including some environmental costs. The 
resultant sharp increase in electricity price should automatically stimulate moves 
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towards energy efficiency improvements.479 There are some aspects that may detract 
from this effect. Some concerns exist that industry may not be subject to their full 
share of the increased prices. Long-term price agreements between Eskom and 
industry customers should be made more transparent and aligned to the price hikes to 
ensure that this effect is carried through to industry.480  The ability of electricity 
suppliers to pass the full cost of the electricity levy on to the customer means that the 
power supply industry is not incentivised to improve energy efficiency by this 
MBI.481 Another concern is that the main driver for the current pricing levels appears 
to be cost of financing the production capacity upgrade. The approach seems to lack 
the certainty that electricity will continue to be priced at a level that drives energy 
efficiency once sufficient capacity becomes available to the grid.  
 
Industrial consumers faced with increased energy costs are afforded a number 
of positive incentives to implement energy efficiency projects, through the DSM and 
S12I investment allowance if the qualifying criteria are met. Industries implementing 
energy efficiency projects will benefit by reduced investment costs for the project 
and ultimately a reduced electricity bill. Increased tax from energy savings may be 
partially offset under the Energy Efficiency Savings Allowance. These incentives 
taken together appear to be extremely favourable to the implementation of energy 
efficiency projects within industry. However, experience internationally indicates 
that profitable energy efficiency opportunities are often passed over by businesses.482 
This phenomenon, sometimes termed the ‘efficiency gap’ or ‘energy paradox’, 
means that even although energy efficiency projects should be easily justified on 
avoided energy costs, there may be ‘non-price barriers’ that weaken the effectiveness 
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of the price signal to promote energy efficiency in industry.483 These may include a 
lack of understanding by industries of the opportunities available, executive bias 
towards production improvement over efficiency improvement projects, the 
perceived ‘high risk’ of energy efficiency projects by investors and high 
administration costs associated with accessing some of the opportunities.484 Most of 
these barriers would need to be addressed by other forms of regulatory intervention, 
such as information programmes. 485  This conclusion supports the international 
experience that a mix of policy instruments provides a more robust regulatory 
environment than the implementation of MBIs alone.486 
 
Some of the MBIs, particularly the S12I Investment Allowance are 
complicated and may be subject to similar administrative issues that hamper 
traditional regulatory methods.487 There also appears to be a lack of harmonisation 
between the complex array of MBIs discussed above. Several regulatory bodies are 
involved. NERSA is taking the lead with the design of REFIT and COFIT, while the 
Treasury is the main architect of the electricity levy and the S12 incentives.488 The 
DSM funding programme is administered by Eskom in conjunction with ESCOs. 
This may lead to inconsistencies and unintended interaction between these 
instruments. In fact, some argue that the current range of MBIs recently introduced 
to promote energy efficiency and mitigate GHG emissions may prove contradictory 
and ineffective.489 A more structured, coordinated approach is therefore required to 
align MBIs and other regulatory measures to achieve energy efficiency and climate 
change objectives.490 
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Much of the recent regulatory activity around energy efficiency has focused 
on electricity consumption. This is understandable under the current circumstances 
where there is a shortfall in electricity generation capacity. At the same time though, 
there have been limited MBIs implemented to internalise the social and 
environmental costs of other energy products such as coal or fuel oil.491 The positive 
incentives provided by S12I Investment Allowance and the Energy Efficiency Savings 
Allowance are applicable to all energy products. There is a risk that industries shift to 
other energy products, instead of electricity, if the technology is available and the 
relative prices provide a business incentive. Fuel switching will detract from energy 
efficiency objectives and may result in increased GHG emissions depending on the 
fuels involved.  
In summary, considerable progress has been made towards implementing 
energy, environmental and fiscal policies that promote energy efficiency in industry 
through the use of MBIs, either directly or through their contribution to a more cost 
reflective electricity price signal. The complexity and apparent lack of coordination 
between these MBIs and some other non-price barriers may detract from their 
effectiveness. Some of these issues may be best addressed by more traditional 
regulatory measures. However, there is an opportunity to extend the current range of 
MBIs to cover the pricing of other energy products and harmonise the overall effect 
on energy efficiency and GHG emissions. Experience with energy–carbon taxes in 
the European Union has indicated that these can be used successfully to promote 
energy efficiency in industry. The South African government has indicated a 
willingness to consider carbon taxes to reduce GHG emissions and improve energy 
efficiency. In view of this, the following chapter considers the potential 
implementation of an energy-carbon taxation regime in South Africa to overcome 
this shortcoming in the existing array of MBIs that promote energy efficiency in 
industry. 
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6. Future Direction for South Africa: Potential for Energy-Carbon 
Taxation to Broaden Current Range of MBIs that Promote 
Energy Efficiency in Industry 
 
As discussed in chapter 5, South Africa currently has a fairly comprehensive 
array of market-based instruments (MBIs) that promote energy efficiency in 
industry. The only potential shortfall appears to be the unequal coverage of all 
energy products. This chapter explores how this may be addressed by examining 
European Union (EU) experience with the use of energy-carbon taxes and South 
Africa’s fledgling carbon tax direction expressed in the Treasury’s discussion paper 
Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions: the Carbon Tax Option (Carbon Tax 
Discussion Paper).492 The introduction to this chapter provides some background on 
energy-carbon taxes and their successful use in the EU. Thereafter, the energy-
carbon tax options as described in the EU Council Directive Restructuring the 
Community Framework for the Taxation of Energy Products and Electricity493 (EU 
Directive on Energy Taxation) and the Carbon Tax Discussion Paper, are discussed 




Energy taxes have long been used in Europe, primarily to raise revenue from 
the use of transport fuels. 494 In the 1990s, the focus of energy taxation began to 
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change with the Scandinavian countries leading the way in implementing energy and 
emissions taxes to address environmental pressures. 495  Finland (1990), Sweden 
(1990), Norway (1991) and Denmark (1992) introduced taxes on carbon emissions 
and adjusted energy taxes in tax shifting efforts to both address emerging climate 
change concerns and reduce the high income tax burden. Since then several other 
European countries have followed suit, Netherlands (1996), Slovenia (1997), 
Germany (1998) and United Kingdom (2000).496  
 
The energy-carbon tax regimes implemented in these member states differed 
significantly in design and application.497  The development of energy-carbon tax 
systems and the differences between them is covered elsewhere in literature.498 This 
dissertation focuses on the EU level legislation regarding energy-carbon taxation, 
particularly the EU Directive on Energy Taxation.499  
 
Energy-carbon taxes have taken various forms; either as taxes on energy 
content, taxes on electricity consumption or taxes on specific emissions associated 
with fuel use, such as carbon dioxide, sulphur dioxide or nitrous oxides. 500 The 
combined effect of an energy-carbon taxation regime is favourable as both demand 
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and substitution effects come into play to achieve energy efficiency and 
environmental improvements. The demand effect is brought about by a decrease in 
demand due to tax-induced higher prices. Ideally, this would be achieved by 
improvements in energy efficiency. The substitution effect decreases emissions by 
fostering a switchover to less carbon intensive fuels.501  This effect is only supported 
if the taxation regime covers all energy products. 
 
One of the main lessons from EU experience incorporated into the EU 
Directive on Energy Taxation is that all energy products should be covered by an 
energy-carbon tax regime. Prior to this, countries that allowed exemptions for certain 
products found that the effectiveness of the tax system was negatively impacted.502 A 
notable example was Germany’s exemption of coal from energy taxes up until 2007 
under the country’s subsidisation of the coal industry. 503  The effectiveness of 
Germany’s energy taxes to reduce fuel consumption and greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions was significantly reduced as a result.504 This lesson is particularly apt for 
South Africa where the current range of MBIs does not impact significantly on the 
energy pricing of products other than electricity. For this reason, energy-carbon taxes 
are put forward as a potential opportunity to overcome the potential shortfall. 
 
The EU has been developing and implementing policy to promote energy 
efficiency in its member states since 1998. 505  Energy-carbon taxes and the EU 
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Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) 506  are of key importance in implementing 
energy efficiency policy. 507  The EU ETS is not considered in depth in this 
dissertation as it is an MBI that creates a new market. In any event, even prior to the 
EU ETS implementation in 2005, the EU has demonstrated considerable success in 
achieving energy efficiency improvements, especially in industry.  The estimated 
primary energy saving in the EU from energy efficiency improvements between 
1997 and 2006 was equivalent to one third of crude imports to the EU in 2006. 508 
The main energy consumers in Europe, namely transport, households and industry 
improved energy efficiency overall by 11 per cent during the period. Industry proved 
to be the most successful in implementing energy efficiency measures with an 
estimated improvement of 24 per cent over the period.509  
 
Due to the success of the EU energy efficiency policies and the use of 
energy-carbon taxes in achieving industrial energy efficiency improvements, the 
energy-carbon tax system described under the EU Directive on Energy Taxation is 
now considered in the context of broadening the existing array of MBIs in South 
Africa.  
 
6.2. The EU Directive on Energy Taxation 
 
In order to avoid potential competitiveness effects caused by the inconsistent 
design and application of energy-carbon taxes within EU member states and to 
address growing climate change concerns, the EU commission made several attempts 
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to develop legislation for energy-carbon taxation. 510  This culminated in the EU 
Directive on Energy Taxation published in 2003 which provides the fiscal 
framework and minimum tax rates for energy products and electricity throughout the 
EU. 511  This directive fell short of the harmonised EU energy and carbon tax 
originally proposed to mitigate GHGs, 512  but it does provide some structure to 
energy taxation in Europe and significantly extends the coverage of previous 
legislation that included only the products of mineral oil.513  
 
The EU Directive on Energy Taxation incorporates all energy products and 
electricity used for the purposes of fuel or heating514  and obliges member states to 
set taxes above minimum prescribed levels. 515  The directive does not require 
differentiation of taxes into separate energy and environmental (or carbon) taxes, but 
refers to the total taxes levied on ‘the quantity of energy products and electricity at 
the time of release for consumption’.516  
 
As long as the minimum tax levels are exceeded, member states may apply 
different rates for business and non-business uses.517 Tax reductions up to the level 
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of complete exemption are allowed for industries classified as energy-intensive518 or 
industries that have entered into agreements or trading schemes that result in energy 
efficiency or environmental improvements.519 Even industries that are not considered 
energy-intensive may be eligible for tax reductions up to 50 per cent520 if deemed to 
achieve a desired environmental outcome. 521  Industries that benefit from these 
energy-carbon tax reductions must enter into agreements, trading schemes or 
undertake other suitable measures to achieve the intended outcome of the EU 
Directive on Energy Taxation.522 
 
The concept of allowing energy-carbon tax reductions in conjunction with 
energy efficiency agreements or an emission trading scheme builds on the past 
experience of EU member states where these have been successfully implemented to 
achieve energy efficiency improvements and GHG reductions. Denmark was first to 
implement this approach in 1996 and since then, Danish companies entering into 
agreements with the Danish Energy Agency have been subject to reduced tax rates of 
varying amounts.  Heavy industry is eligible for the greatest benefits under the 
scheme. In 2005 the reduced tax rate was 88 per cent lower than the rate applicable 
without an agreement.523 Companies with agreements achieved energy efficiency 
savings of about 60 per cent better than those subject to the tax alone.524  Denmark 
also earmarked about 20 per cent of energy-carbon tax revenue to promote and fund 
industrial energy efficiency improvements projects. The funding programme was 
administered by the Danish Energy Agency and independent auditors were used to 
identify improvement projects. About one thousand companies received subsidies 
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annually under this programme. 525  These measures are considered to be largely 
responsible for the 30 per cent improvement in industrial energy efficiency between 
1990 and 2000.526  
 
A similar arrangement is in place in the UK. Energy-intensive industries 
stand to recover 80 per cent of their Climate Change Levy (CCL) by committing to 
energy efficiency targets within legally binding Climate Change Agreements 
(CCA).527 The targets are negotiated with the sector associations.528 CCL revenues 
are partially recycled to support energy efficiency in business. The Carbon Trust was 
set up to oversee the enhanced capital allowance (ECA) scheme that provides 
investment funding for energy efficiency projects and runs best practice and low-
carbon innovation programmes that supply information and support in the field of 
energy efficient technology.529  
 
The definition of energy-intensive industry is important in determining who 
is eligible for special arrangements. This issue has also not been uniformly applied 
across member states. The EU Directive on Energy Taxation classifies industries as 
energy-intensive if either the energy bill or the energy tax burden exceeds certain 
thresholds as a percentage of business metrics.530 Alternatively, a more stringent 
definition may be used. Under the German system, industrial sectors that benefit 
from special tax arrangements fall within statistical classifications so the actual 
energy-intensity status of individual industries is not assessed.531 This contrasts with 
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the Danish system where specific production processes are eligible.532 In the UK, 
energy-intensive industries are defined to be those registered under the EU Council 
Directive Concerning Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control.533  
 
‘Tradable permit schemes’ are the alternative option to agreements in the EU 
Directive on Energy Taxation.534 The most prominent scheme in the EU is the EU 
ETS implemented in 2005. 535  Under the EU ETS, emission caps are set for 
individual facilities. Facilities that emit less than the cap may sell the allowance to 
other facilities who have failed to reach their target. This sets the overall GHG target 
to be reached while allowing a carbon pricing mechanism to drive individual 
company mitigation efforts. In this sense, it has a similar effect to a carbon tax linked 
to an agreement. The EU ETS covers emission-intensive industries such as, power 
plants larger than 20 megawatts, oil refineries, and many energy-intensive industries 
that are covered by the EU Directive on Energy Taxation. 536 This gave rise to the 
concern that certain sectors would be subject to double-regulation.537 As the EU 
Directive on Energy Taxation allows for reduced rates for industries that fall under a 
suitable trading system,538 several countries have applied for exemption of industry 
covered by the EU ETS.539  
 
At an EU level, there has been little subsequent effort to further develop 
energy-carbon taxation legislation beyond the EU Directive on Energy Taxation as 
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the EU ETS provides an alternative mechanism to achieve the GHG commitments 
made by member states under the Kyoto Protocol.540  
 
6.3. The South African Discussion Paper on Carbon Tax 
 
The South African government is in the early phases of evaluating carbon 
taxation for possible inclusion in the climate change response effort.541 The National 
Treasury’s Carbon Tax Discussion Paper542 outlines some possible design options 
and key considerations which may be used to inform the future design and 
implementation of a carbon tax regime in South Africa. 
 
The Carbon Tax Discussion Paper puts forward three carbon tax options. 
These include a direct tax on measured carbon dioxide emissions and two variations 
of a proxy tax on energy sources proportional to their carbon content. The latter 
variations relate to the incidence of the tax, either upstream at the level of fossil fuel 
inputs to the economy (crude oil, coal and natural gas) or downstream on energy 
products, such as liquid fuels and electricity.543 The downstream proxy tax most 
closely resembles the EU energy-carbon taxes discussed above.  
 
The three options cover different tax bases and are, therefore, differentiated 
by the level of administrative complexity. The measured emissions option 
incorporates all emitters of GHG, including industry, transport and domestic 
consumers of fossil-fuel based energy. Accurate emissions data is required to 
determine the appropriate amount of tax to be paid by individual emitters. A suitable 
system of measurement, monitoring and verification would be required to support the 
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implementation of the direct tax option.544 The upstream proxy tax option covers a 
small tax base of approximately 67 coal mines, 13 natural gas processors and 6 
petroleum refineries. 545  Rebates or exemptions may be considered for non-
combustion uses of fossil fuels and to encourage the implementation of end-of-pipe 
CO2 removal, such as carbon capture and storage technologies.546 The downstream 
proxy tax option potentially covers a large tax base similar to the direct tax. All users 
of fossil fuel-based energy products would be targeted, similar to the measured 
emissions option.547 Although the direct tax on measured emissions is favoured as 
the most direct approach to GHG mitigation, an upstream proxy tax based on the 
carbon content of fossil fuel inputs is considered to be the second best option and 
may be easier to implement.548  
 
Regardless of the carbon tax option chosen, Carbon Tax Discussion Paper 
identifies some key considerations for the design of a carbon tax in South Africa. 
There should be comprehensive coverage of all sectors as far as possible. 549 
Although the intention would be to escalate the tax rate over time to fully internalise 
the environmental costs of fossil fuels, 550  low tax rates are proposed for initial 
implementation.551 The Carbon Tax Discussion Paper suggests that an escalating tax 
between R75 and R200 per ton CO2 equivalent552 would be feasible and drive the 
desired GHG emissions reduction and energy efficiency improvements. 553 
Distributional impacts are of particular concern in South Africa and need to be 
addressed in a transparent and targeted manner to limit the negative impact on poorer 
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households and the competitiveness of key industries.554 Relief measures to address 
competitiveness should be limited and temporary.555 Some form of revenue recycling 
through tax shifting is envisaged as part of a carbon tax regime, although full-
earmarking is not recommended.556 
 
6.4. A Comparison of the South African Carbon Tax Options against EU 
Energy-Carbon Taxes 
 
This section compares and contrasts South Africa’s possible carbon tax 
options against the energy-carbon taxes contemplated in the EU Directive on Energy 
Taxation using relevant evaluation criteria described in Chapter 3.3 
 
The EU Directive on Energy Taxation and the carbon tax options described in 
the Carbon Tax Discussion Paper aim to cover all fossil-fuel energy products. In this 
sense, if properly designed, any of these tax options would address the potential 
shortfall with the current array of MBIs that was identified in chapter 5.8.  
 
The environmental intent of implementing energy-carbon taxes is to reduce 
GHG emissions by fostering a switch to less carbon intensive fuels and by improving 
energy efficiency. South Africa currently has limited low-carbon energy alternatives 
such as natural gas and renewable energy. 557  In terms of energy efficiency, the 
incentive for improvement depends on the extent to which costs of energy-carbon 
taxes are passed through to consumers.  The South African energy sector is highly 
regulated and prices for electricity and transport fuels (petrol and diesel) are set by 
the regulators. 558  The cost of a carbon tax would presumably be passed on to 
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98 
electricity consumers in a similar way to the electricity levy.559 For transport fuels, 
an overhaul of the pricing structures would be necessary in order to provide a 
realistic price signal to consumers and to avoid an inappropriate burden on 
refiners. 560   The regulated pricing aspect is not addressed in the Carbon Tax 
Discussion Paper.561 
The pass-through of costs links to the distributional effects of an energy-
carbon tax. In South Africa, industry and low-income households may be particularly 
impacted. 562 In the EU, energy-carbon taxes have been introduced in a tax-shifting 
exercise that increases tax on ‘bads’ (emissions) while reducing taxes on ‘goods’ 
(such as labour). 563  This is termed ‘environmental tax reform’ (ETR). 564 
Theoretically, ETR is ‘tax neutral’ so that the economy as a whole is not 
detrimentally impacted.565 The EU Directive on Energy Taxation does not cover 
ETR specifically as the allocation of tax revenue is the preserve of each member 
state’s administration. EU member states have used ETR unilaterally to reduce 
income tax,566   social security contributions 567  and recycled to revenue support 
energy efficiency and GHG mitigation in industry. In South Africa, lower income 
households traditionally spend a higher proportion of income on transport and 
energy.  The burden of increased costs due to a carbon tax is, therefore, likely to be 
greater for the poor. 568 The Carbon Tax Discussion Paper supports the concept of 
559 As described in chapter 5.7/ 
560 Winkler H, Jooste M & Marquard A ‘Structuring Approaches to Pricing Carbon in Energy-and 
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ETR and advocates off-setting this impact by improved services to low-income 
groups in the form of free basic services such as electricity.569  
 
The competitiveness of industry is also a key consideration in designing 
energy-carbon taxes. 570  As described, the EU Directive on Energy Taxation EU 
allows for reductions and exemptions if suitable environmental measures are in 
place.571  The main driver for special arrangements for industry in Europe has been 
to reduce the impact on competition afforded by differing energy-carbon tax regimes 
within the EU economy. In South Africa, industry would bear a large proportion of 
the burden of energy-carbon taxation as the largest energy consumer.572  Energy-
intensive industries, 573  some of which are also vulnerable to international 
competition, 574  would be particularly impacted. Growth of these industries was 
actively encouraged by industrial development policy until fairly recently.575 Hence, 
there is a risk that some industries may become uneconomic ‘stranded assets’ under 
the effective about-turn in policy that a carbon tax represents.576  As many of the 
energy-intensive industries are currently core to the country’s economy, there is a 
case for reduced rates to be allowed for a period to smooth the impact on the 
economy while companies implement energy efficiency improvements.577  
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 The Carbon Tax Discussion Paper maintains that special arrangements 
should be limited and temporary.578 The UK Climate Change Programme is given as 
an example of a temporary measure in a footnote, but the use of tax reductions linked 
to agreements is not explored in further detail.579 The Carbon Tax Discussion Paper 
also examines the potential for border tax arrangements to overcome international 
competition impacts, but recognises the practical limitations in the absence of 
harmonised global carbon pricing and potential conflicts with the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) rules. 580  The press release issued with the Carbon Tax 
Discussion Paper suggests that the Energy Efficiency Savings Allowance may be 
viewed as a suitable intervention to overcome competitiveness concerns,581 although 
this is not expressly discussed in the document itself. The Treasury is generally 
opposed to extensive use of ‘earmarking’ revenue, but may consider ‘on-budget 
funding’ for environmental programmes. 
 
The three carbon tax options put forward in the Carbon Tax Discussion 
Paper relate to design and administration of the tax. The taxes described in the EU 
Directive on Energy Taxation are levied on the quantity of fuel at the point of 
consumption.582  This is similar to the downstream proxy tax in the Carbon Tax 
Discussion Paper. This is the least favoured option due to administrative complexity 
and environmental effectiveness.583 Energy–carbon taxes are levied as excise taxes in 
the EU and make use of existing tax administration. In South Africa, the energy-
carbon taxes would be an extension of existing fuel taxes and the electricity levy and 
thus build on existing administrative mechanisms.584 For this reason, one could argue 
that a downstream energy-carbon tax would, therefore, not be administratively more 
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complex than the upstream version, even although more tax payers would fall within 
the tax regime. 
 
The EU Directive on Energy Taxation covers energy products and electricity 
used for fuel and heating. It specifically excludes fossil fuels used as process raw 
materials, such as crude oil for refining.585 In South Africa, this would necessarily 
exclude coal feedstock for coal-to-liquid (CTL) technology and crude oil. Most of 
this carbon is transferred to the liquid fuels products.  Hence, the only fossil fuel 
energy products that would be potentially omitted through a downstream energy-
carbon tax would be the own-use energy streams such as refinery fuel gas. In the EU, 
these energy uses are covered by the EU ETS.  
 
In summary, the energy-carbon taxes described in both the EU Directive on 
Energy Taxation and the Carbon Tax Discussion Paper cover all energy products 
and may provide a further opportunity to promote energy efficiency and reduce GHG 
emissions. The EU energy-carbon tax most resembles the downstream tax which is 
the ‘least favoured’ option described in the Carbon Tax Discussion Paper. 
Regardless of the incidence of the tax, the impact on South Africa’s industrial 
competitiveness and low-income households remain key considerations. Experience 
from the EU highlights the successful use of energy efficiency or climate change 
agreements linked to tax reductions to improve industrial energy efficiency and 
reduce GHG emissions. This may provide a way for the South African government 
to address competitiveness concerns while ensuring that environmental targets are 
met. The EU member states have also undertaken tax reform to shift the tax burden 
from labour to energy-carbon taxes. The Carbon Tax Discussion Paper advocates 
using carbon tax revenue to off-set the impact on low income households in a similar 
manner. The Government is still gathering input from stakeholders and evaluating 
the potential impact of a carbon tax on South Africa’s economy. Ultimately, ‘a 
                                                     




balance will need to be established between environmental obligations and South 
Africa’s growth and development plans’.586 
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The energy sector is at the heart of South Africa’s significant environmental 
challenges, particularly in relation to the high level of greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions and the scope of work necessary to reach the government’s international 
climate change commitments. This is mainly due to the consumption of emission-
intensive energy products, such as coal, in conjunction with the energy-intensive and 
relatively energy inefficient industry that characterises the South Africa economy. 
Industrial energy consumption is, therefore, central to any strategy to address GHG 
emissions. At the same time, the energy sector is at the centre of some serious socio-
economic challenges, not least the electricity shortage identified with the crisis in 
2008. Any measures that improve energy efficiency in industrial consumption 
patterns will address both the socio-economic and environmental challenges.  
 
The need for regulatory intervention to promote industrial energy efficiency 
is clear. South African regulatory efforts in the environmental arena have been 
characterised by a reliance on more traditional command-and-control mechanisms.  
These do not necessarily promote the most efficient and cost-effective response, 
especially when coupled with administrative inefficiencies caused by fragmentation 
and the lack of capacity within the Government’s environmental and energy 
departments. Therefore, the South African government is turning increasingly to the 
use of market-based instruments (MBIs) to address environmental challenges in a 
cost effective manner.  
 
MBIs are a group of regulatory instruments that aim to achieve 
environmental goals by using market forces to influence behaviour or to address 
market failures. In the case of industrial energy efficiency in South Africa, the 
market failure is represented by high GHG emissions and a shortfall in electricity 




investment funding for expanding energy needs. Thus, the use of MBIs is an apt 
approach to promoting energy efficiency in industry.  
 
A brief review of South Africa’s energy, environmental and fiscal policy 
identifies the government’s recognition of industrial energy efficiency as a central 
component of the emerging policy direction to address GHG mitigation and energy 
planning.  The policy documents also highlight Government’s willingness to use 
MBIs in order to achieve improved energy efficiency in industry.587 
 
In line with these policies, a number of MBIs have been implemented in 
South Africa to promote energy efficiency in industry to date. Those that use current 
markets include the S12I Investment Allowance for industrial policy projects;588 the 
Energy Efficiency Savings Allowance;589 and a number of instruments that impact on 
the price of electricity, namely: the Electricity Levy;590 the renewable energy feed-in 
tariffs (REFIT); 591  cogeneration feed-in tariffs (COFIT) 592  and demand side 
management programme (DSM).593 While some of these, such as REFIT, may not be 
aimed directly at improving energy efficiency, the cost of the MBI contributes to 
higher electricity prices and drives reduced consumption to avoid increasing costs. 
  
Many of these MBIs have been introduced in the past two years and it 
remains to be seen to what extent the available incentives will be taken up by 
industry and whether this is sufficient to achieve the energy efficiency strategy goal 
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for industry of 15 per cent.594 Some potential benefits and short comings with the 
current array of MBIs are as follows: 
 
The S12 allowances and the DSM provide positive incentives to industry to 
implement energy efficiency projects. These should be supported by other regulatory 
instruments, including information programmes to overcome potential ‘non-price’ 
barriers. Typical barriers include: lack of awareness of the available opportunities; 
executive bias towards production improvement over efficiency improvement 
projects; the perceived ‘high risk’ of energy efficiency projects by investors; and 
high administration costs associated with accessing some of the opportunities.595 
 
Some of the MBIs, particularly the S12I investment allowance, are 
complicated and may be subject to similar administrative issues that hamper 
traditional regulatory methods.596 There is an apparent lack of harmonisation in the 
complex array of MBIs discussed in this dissertation. Several regulatory bodies are 
involved. NERSA is taking the lead with the design of REFIT and COFIT, while the 
Treasury is the main architect of the electricity levy and the S12 incentives.597 The 
DSM funding programme is administered by Eskom in conjunction with ESCOs. 
This may lead to inconsistencies and unintended interaction between these 
instruments. In fact, some argue that the current range of MBIs recently introduced 
to promote energy efficiency and mitigate GHG emissions may prove contradictory 
and ineffective.598 A more structured, coordinated approach is required to align MBIs 
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and other regulatory measures to achieve energy efficiency and climate change 
objectives.599 
 
Most of the MBIs discussed in this dissertation contribute to higher ‘cost 
reflective’ electricity prices. This addresses the market failure identified in relation to 
the inefficient electricity consumption, although improved transparency and equity in 
industrial electricity tariffs is required to ensure that the incentive is effective within 
industry. There are two potential gaps afforded by the current ‘cost reflective’ 
pricing approach. Firstly, the power supply industry is not driven to improve energy 
efficiency as the full cost of the electricity levy is passed on to consumers. Secondly, 
electricity prices may not remain at a level which drives energy efficiency if the 
investment component contributing to current electricity prices is reduced when the 
new build programme is completed. 
 
As discussed, much of the recent regulatory activity around energy efficiency 
has focused on electricity consumption. This is understandable under the current 
circumstances, where there is a shortfall in electricity generation capacity. At the 
same time, though, there have been limited MBIs implemented to internalise the 
social and environmental costs of other energy products, such as coal or fuel oil.600 
There is a risk that industries shift to other energy products instead of electricity if 
the technology is available and the relative prices provide a business incentive. Fuel 
switching may result in increased GHG emissions.  
 
EU experience with the development of energy-carbon taxes, specifically the 
EU Council Directive Restructuring the Community Framework for the Taxation of 
Energy Products and Electricity601 (EU Directive on Energy Taxation) may highlight 
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an opportunity to overcome the shortfall in energy product coverage identified in the 
current array of MBIs. At the same time, South Africa is in the process of developing 
fledging carbon tax direction. This is outlined in the discussion paper Reducing 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions: the Carbon Tax Option (Carbon Tax Discussion 
Paper).602  
 
  The energy-carbon taxes described in both the EU Directive on Energy 
Taxation and the Carbon Tax Discussion Paper cover all energy products and 
electricity.603 In this sense, any of the design options may be suitable to extend the 
range of MBIs that promote energy efficiency and reduce GHG emissions. The EU 
energy-carbon tax most resembles the downstream tax which is the ‘least favoured’ 
option described in the Carbon Tax Discussion Paper. Regardless of the incidence of 
the tax, the impact on South Africa’s industrial competitiveness and low-income 
households remain key considerations. The EU experience with energy-carbon taxes 
offers some lessons for South Africa in this regard. Energy efficiency or climate 
change agreements linked to tax reductions have been used successfully in Europe. 
This may provide a way for the South African government to address 
competitiveness concerns while ensuring that environmental targets are met. The EU 
member states have also used energy-carbon taxation to shift taxes away from 
income and social security taxes. The South African Government advocates using 
carbon tax revenue to off-set the impact on low income households in a similar 
manner, but it not clear to what extent tax-shifting will be employed. 604  The 
Government is still gathering input from stakeholders and evaluating the potential 
impact of a carbon tax on South Africa’s economy. Ultimately, ‘a balance will need 
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to be established between environmental obligations and South Africa’s growth and 
development plans’.605 
 
                                                     
605 Creamer T ‘SA Moves to Finalise Carbon Tax This Year, Despite Global Loose Ends’ 16 March 
2011 Mining Weekly. Available at http://www.miningweekly.com/article/sa-moves-to-finalise-carbon-














Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
Customs and Excise Act 91of 1964  
Electricity Act 41 of 1987  
Electricity Regulation Act 4 of 2006 
Income Tax Act 58 of 1962  
Manufacturing Development Act 187 of 1993 
National Energy Act 34 of 2008  
National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998 
National Environmental Management: Air Quality Act 39 of 2004 
National Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act 10 of 2004 
National Environmental Management: Integrated Coastal Management Act 24 of 2008  
National Environmental Management: Protected Areas Act 57 of 2003 
National Environmental Management: Waste Act 59 of 2008  
National Water Act 36 of 1998 
Revenue Laws Amendment Act 60 of 2008 
Taxation Laws Amendment Act 7 of 2010 
 
Subordinate legislation, policy documents and other government documents 
 
Department of Energy Electricity Regulation Act 4 of 2006. Electricity Regulations on New 
Generation Capacity in GNR 1130 GG33819 of 30 November 2010 
Department of Environment Affairs and Tourism A National Climate Change Response 




Department of Environment Affairs and Tourism Draft National Greenhouse Gas Inventory 
for the Republic of South Africa: Invitation for written representations and/or objections in 
GN 1104 GG 32490 of 12 August 2009.  
Department of Environment Affairs and Tourism National Climate Change Response Policy 
Discussion Document for the 2009 National Climate Change Response Policy Development 
Summit, Midrand, 2-6 March 2009 
Department of Environment Affairs and Tourism White Paper on Environmental 
Management Policy for South Africa in GN 749 GG 18894 of 15 May 1998 
Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism National Environmental Management: 
Air Quality Act (39/2004): Notice to Establish the National Framework in terms of Section 
7(1) in GN 1138 GG 30284 of 11 September 2007.  
Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism National Environmental Management: 
Air Quality Act (39/2004): National Ambient Air Quality Standards in GN 1210 GG 32816 
of 24 December 2009 
Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism National Environmental Management: 
Air Quality Act (39/2004): Vaal Triangle Air-Shed Priority Area Air Quality Management 
Plan in GNR 613 GG 32263 of 28 May 2009 
Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism National Environmental Management: 
Air Quality Act 39 of 2004:List of Activities which Result in Atmospheric Emissions which 
Have or May Have a Significant Detrimental Effect on the Environment, including Health, 
Social Conditions, Economic Conditions, Ecological Conditions or Cultural Heritage in GN 
248 GG 33064 of 31 March 2010 
Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism Ratification of the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change in GN1676 GG18539 of 19 December 1997 
Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism South Africa: Initial National 
Communication under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(2004). 
Department of Environmental Affairs National Climate Change Response Green Paper 
(2010) in GN1083 GG33801 of 25 November 2010 
Department of Finance Customs and Excise Act 1964. Amendment of Schedule no 
1(No.1/3B/14) in GNR 256 GG 34166 of 28 March 2011 
Department of Minerals and Energy Electricity Pricing Policy (EPP) of the South African 
Electricity Supply Industry in GN 1938 GG 31741of 19 December 2008 
Department of Minerals and Energy National Energy Efficiency Strategy of the Republic of 
South Africa, First Review October 2008 in GN 908 GG 32342 of 26 June 2009 
Department of Minerals and Energy NERSA Renewable Feed-in Tariff (REFIT) Regulatory 
Guidelines  26 March 2009 in GN382 GG32122 of 17 April 2009 
Department of Minerals and Energy White Paper on the Energy Policy of the Republic of 
South Africa GN 307 GG 19606 of 17 of December 1998 




Republic of South Africa (2003) in GN 513 GG 26169 of 14 May 2004 
Department of Trade and Industry Section 12i Tax Allowance Programme in GN 480 to 484 
GG 34456 of 13 July 2011 
Department of Water and Environment Affairs Draft National Strategy on Sustainable 
Development and Action Plan 2010-2014 in GN 393 GG 33184 of 14 May 2010 
Government of South Africa Background Information and Discussion Document to facilitate 
the Climate Change Policy Engagement (2010) Revision 5.0 
South African Government National Response to South Africa’s Electricity Shortage (Jan 
2008). Available at http://www.info.gov.za/otherdocs/2008/resp_elec.pdf (Accessed 
06.09.2011) 
National Treasury Budget 2008/2009 Tax proposals (2008). Available at 
http://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/national%20budget/2008/guides/Budget%20Proposal
s%202008.pdf(Accessed 06.09.2011)  
National Treasury Budget 2009/2010 Tax Proposals (2009). Available at 
http://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/national%20budget/2009/guides/Budget%20Proposal
s%202009.pdf (Accessed 06.09.2011)  
National Treasury Budget 2010/2011 Tax proposals (2010). Available at 
http://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/national%20budget/2010/guides/Budget%20Tax%20
Proposals.pdf (Accessed 06.09.2011)  
National Treasury Discussion Paper Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions: The Carbon Tax 
Option (2010). Available at 
http://www.treasury.gov.za/public%20comments/Discussion%20Paper%20Carbon%20Taxe
s%2081210.pdf  
Department of Energy, Electrification Policy Development and Management Directorate 
Electrification Statistics (2009)  
Department of Environment Affairs (Alf Wills) letter to Executive Secretary of UNFCCC 29 
January 2010. Available at http://unfccc.int/meetings/items/5276.php.  (Accessed 
10.09.2011) 
Department of Minerals and Energy Energy Efficiency Accord (August 2006) (updated). 
Available at http://www.nbi/org/za/SiteCollectionDocuments/energy_efficiency_accord.pdf 
(Accessed 11.09.2011) 
Department of Minerals and Energy, Directorate: Energy Planning and Development Digest 
of South African Energy Statistics (2009) 4 ed. 
Department of Minerals and Energy, Directorate: Energy Planning and Development Digest 
of South African Energy Statistics (2006)  
National Treasury Draft Explanatory Memorandum on the Taxation Laws Amendment Bill 
2009. Available at 
http://www.treasury.gov.za/public%20comments/EM%20for%20TLAB%202009.pdfwww.tr




National Treasury Draft Policy Paper: A Framework for Considering Market–Based 
Instruments to Support Environmental Fiscal Reform in South Africa (2006) Government 
Printers, Pretoria 
National Treasury Regulations made under Section 12I of the Income Tax Act, 1962 (Act 
No.58 of 1962) in GNR 639 GG 33385 of 23 July 2010 




ed-In-%20Tariff.pdf   (Accessed 06.09.2011). 




s.pdf (Accessed 06.09.2011). 




In%20Tariffs%20Consultation%20Paper.pdf (Accessed 06.09.2011). 
NERSA Decision Determination of the Municipal Tariff Guideline and the Revision of 






12%20financial%20year3803022010120332.pdf (Accessed 06.09.2011)  




03.pdf (Accessed 06.09.2011) 
NERSA Reasons for Decision: Revenue Application – Multi-Year Price Determination 
2010/11 to 2012/13 (MYPD 2) by Eskom Holdings Limited (Eskom) (2010). Available at 
http://www.nersa.org.za/ Regulator Decisions>Electricity. (Accessed 06.09.2011). 
NERSA Renewable Energy Feed–In Tariff Phase II (2009). Available at 
http://www.nersa.org.za/Admin/Document/Editor/file/Electricity/REFIT%20Phase%20II%2
0150709.pdf  (Accessed 06.09.2011). 
South African Government Draft Clean Technology Fund Investment Plan (October 2009) 
SARS Notes for Schedule 1/Part3/Section B dated 2011-03-31. Available at 






European Council Directive 92/81/EEC Harmonization of the Structures of Excise Duties on 
Mineral Oils 
European Council Directive 92/82/EEC of 19 October 1992 Approximation of the Rates of 
Duties on Mineral Oils 
European Council Directive 2003/87/EC of 13 October 2003 Establishing a Scheme for 
Greenhouse Gas Emission Allowance Trading with the Community and Amending Council 
Directive 96/61/EC OJ (L275) 
European Council Directive 2003/96/EC of 27 October 2003 Restructuring the Community 
Framework for the Taxation of Energy Products and Electricity OJ (L283) 
European Council Directive 2008/1/EC of 15 January 2008 Concerning Integrated Pollution 
Prevention and Control OJ (L24/8) 
 
Subordinate legislation and policy documents 
 
Commission of European Communities Green Paper on Market-Based Instruments for 
Environment and Related Policy Purposes COM (2007) 140 
Commission of the European Communities Action Plan for Energy Efficiency: Realising the 
Potential COM (2006) 545  
Commission of the European Communities Action Plan to Improve Energy Efficiency in the 
European Union COM (2000) 247 
Commission of the European Communities Energy Efficiency in the European Community- 
Towards a Strategy for the Rational Use of Energy COM (1998) 246  
Commission of the European Communities Energy Efficiency: Delivering the 20% Target 
COM (2008) 772 
Commission of the European Communities Restructuring the Community Framework for the 
Taxation of Energy Products COM (97) 30 
European Commission Community Guidelines on State Aid for Environmental Protection 
2008/C82/01 
European Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council Amending Directive 2003/87/EC so as to Improve and Extend the Greenhouse Gas 






Andersen MS ‘Environmental and Economic Implications of Taxing and Trading Carbon: 
Some European Experiences’ (2008) 10 Vermont Journal of Environmental Law 61 
Andersen MS ‘Vikings and Virtues: a Decade of CO2 Taxation’ (2004) Climate Policy 4 
Andersen MS and Speck S ‘Environmental Tax Reforms in Europe :Stabilisation, Mitigation 
and Compensation’ in Andersen M,  Barker T, Christie E, Ekins P, Gerald J, Jilkova 
J, Junankar S, Landesmann M,  Pollitt H, Salmons R, Scott S & Speck S (eds) 
Competitiveness Effects of Environmental Tax Reforms: Final Report to the European 
Commission (2007) National Environmental Research Institute, University of Aarhus 
Arendse J ‘Go Green or Get Taxed’ (2008) 9 (4) JB-PREJ 21 
Cloete B and Robb G Carbon Pricing and Industrial Policy in South Africa Unpublished 
paper presented at ‘Putting a Price on Carbon’ Conference held at the University of Cape 
Town, 23-24 March 2010  
Creamer T ‘SA Moves to Finalise Carbon Tax This Year, Despite Global Loose Ends’ 16 
March 2011 Mining Weekly. Available at http://www.miningweekly.com/article/sa-moves-
to-finalise-carbon-tax-this-year-despite-global-loose-ends-2011-03-16-1 (Accessed 
09.09.2011) 
Creamer T ‘South Africa Has to Show Greater Power-Crisis Urgency’ 15 Jan 2010 
Engineering News 
Efficiency Evaluation Organisation International Performance Measurement and 
Verification Protocol: Concepts and Options for Determining Energy and Water Savings 
Vol 1 (2010). Available at http://www.evo-world.org/ (Accessed 11.09.2011) 
Eskom ‘Eskom’s DSM Programme Offers Greater Financial Support to Businesses and 
Municipalities’ (4 December 2004) 10 (4) Energy Management News 
Eskom ‘Shaping the Power Conservation Programme in South Africa’ (March 2009) 
Interface Magazine 15 
Eskom Eskom DSM Current and Future presented at an M and V workshop on 4 March 
2010 
European Environment Agency Market-based Instruments for Environmental Policy in 
Europe (2005) EEA Technical Report No. 8/2005 
Gilbertson T and Reyes O ‘When the Cap Does Not Fit- Cap and Trade and the Failure of 
the EU Emissions Trading Scheme’ (2009) 7 Critical Currents Dag Hammarskjold 
Foundation Occasional Paper Series 31. 
Henderson PGW ‘Fiscal Incentives for Environmental Protection – Conceptual Framework’ 
(1995) 1 SAJELP 55  
Henderson PGW ‘Fiscal Incentives for Environmental Protection – Introduction’ (1994) 1 
SAJELP 49  
Henderson PGW ‘Fiscal Incentives for Environmental Protection – Way Forward’ (1995) 2 




Jackson J ‘Promoting Energy Efficiency Investments with Risk Management Decision 
Tools’ (2010) 38 Energy Policy 3865 
Kleynhans EPJ and Kotze LJ ‘A Critical Analysis of the Effect of South African 
Environmental Legislation on the International Competitiveness of Local Industries’ (2008) 
15 (2) SAJELP 245 
Mandy K ‘Carbon Taxes Versus Cap-and-Trade’ (Jun/Jul 2010) Tax professional  
National Treasury Press Release: Carbon Tax Discussion Paper (2010). Available at 
http://www.treasury.gov.za/public%20comments/Final%20Press%20Release%20Carbon%2
0Tax%20Discussion%20Paper.pdf  (Accessed 06.09.2011) 
Njobeni S ‘Switch to Clean Fuels 'To Cost SA R40 Billion' 27 February 2009 Business Day 
Nkomo JC ‘Energy and Economic Development: Challenges for South Africa’ (2005) 16 (3) 
Journal of Energy of South Africa 10 
Paterson A ‘Incentive-Based Measures’ in A Paterson A and Kotze LJ (eds) Environmental 
Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa: Legal Perspectives (2009) Juta, Cape Town, 
232-321. 
Paterson AR ‘Environmental Fiscal Reforming South Africa: Considering Recent 
Developments’ (2009) 16 (1) SAJELP 23 
Paterson AR ‘Pruning the Money Tree to Ensure Sustainable Growth: Facilitating 
Sustainable Development through Market-Based Instruments’ 2006 (3) PER 1/27  
Pigou AC The Economics of Welfare, 4ed (1932) Macmillan, London. 
Rastello S and Lourens C ‘Eskom Gets $3.75 Billion World Bank Loan for Coal-Fired Plant’ 
9 April 2010 Bloomberg Business Day 
Robb G, Tyler E and Cloete B Carbon Trading or Carbon Tax? Weighing Up South Africa’s 
Mitigation Options Unpublished paper presented at ‘Putting a Price on Carbon’ Conference 
held at the University of Cape Town, 23-24 March 2010, 196-213 
SABS Measurement and Verification of Energy Savings (SATS 50010:2010) SABS 
Standards Division Pretoria 
SAPIA ‘The Cleaner Fuels Journey in South Africa’. Available at 
http://www.sapia.co.za/Default.aspx?PageID=7864726&A=SearchResult&SearchID=64368
3&ObjectID=7864726&ObjectType=1 ( Accessed 06.09.2011) 
SAPIA Petrol and Diesel in South Africa and the Impact on Air Quality (2008). 
Sasol Sasol Facts (2009).  Available at 
http://www.sasol.com/sasol_internet/frontend/navigation.jsp?navid=1600033&rootid=2 
(Accessed 06.09.2011) 
Scenario Building Team 2007 Long Term Mitigation Scenarios-Strategic Options for South 
Africa: Technical Summary (2007) Department of Environment Affairs and Tourism, 
Pretoria 






Spalding-Fecher R and Matibe DK ’Electricity and Externalities in South Africa’ (2003) 31 
Energy Policy 721 
Speck S ‘ The Design of Carbon and Broad-Based Energy Taxes in European Countries’ 
(2008-2009) 10 Vermont Journal of Environmental Law 31 
Speck S ‘Overview of Environmental Tax Reforms in EU Member States’ in Andersen 
M,  Barker T, Christie E, Ekins P, Gerald J, Jilkova J, Junankar S, Landesmann M,  Pollitt 
H, Salmons R, Scott S & Speck S (eds) Competitiveness Effects of Environmental Tax 
Reforms: Final Report to the European Commission (2007) National Environmental 
Research Institute, University of Aarhus 
Stavins R 'Experience with Market-Based Environmental Policy Instruments' in Möler  K & 
Vincent  J(eds) Handbook of Environmental Economics (2003) Vol 1 Elsevier Science, 
North-Holland 355-435  
Timberg C ‘Government at Fault in S. Africa's Electricity Crisis, Mbeki Says’ 9 February 
2008 Washington Post  
Trade and Industry Chamber Fund for Research into Industrial Development (FRIDGE): 
Study to Provide an Overview of the Use of Economic Instruments and Develop Sectoral 
Plans to Mitigate the Effects of Climate Change (2010) Genesis Analytics (Pty) Ltd, 
Johannesburg 
Tyler E Aligning South African Energy and Climate Change Mitigation Policy (2009) 
Energy Research Centre, University of Cape Town 
Tyler E, Du Toit M &Dunn Z Emissions Trading as a Policy Option for Greenhouse Gas 
Mitigation in South Africa (2009) Energy Research Centre, University of Cape Town 
Winkler H & Marquard A Analysis of the Economic Implications of a Carbon Tax (2009) 
Energy Research Centre, University of Cape Town 
Winkler H (ed) Energy Policies for Sustainable Development: Options for the Future (2006) 
Energy Research Centre, University of Cape Town  
Winkler H, Howells M & Baumert K ‘Sustainable Development Policies and Measures: 
Institutional Issues and Electrical Efficiency in South Africa’ (2007) 7 Climate Policy 212 
Winkler H, Jooste M & Marquard A ‘Structuring Approaches to Pricing Carbon in Energy-
and Trade-Intensive Sectors in South Africa’ (2010) 10 Climate Policy 527 
 
 
Name : Judith Greer Cargill 
Student Number: STLJUD001 
Course : PBL 6024W 
Declaration 
1. I know that plagiarism is wrong. Plagiarism is to use another’s work and
pretend that it is one’s own.
2. I have used the UCT Law faculty writing guideline convention for citation and
referencing. Each contribution to, and quotation in, this dissertation The Role
of Market-Based Instruments that Use Existing Markets to Promote Energy
Efficiency in South African Industry from the works of others has been
attributed, and has been cited and referenced.
3. This dissertation is my own work.
4. I have not allowed, and will not allow, anyone to copy my work with the
intention of passing it off as his or her own work.
Signature : Signature removed 
Date :  14 September 2011 
